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In the course of globalization and the increasing international communication and 
trade, the rules governing the international trade are getting more and more impor-
tant. Some authors even follow the opinion that when the world becomes one market, 
this market will require one law.1  Numerous companies and entrepreneurs are chal-
lenged and forced to deal with the approaches in foreign countries. In order to coun-
teract the resulting legal insecurities, various international principles and rules got 
developed such as the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts2 
and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods3.  
 
The former secretary of the United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law4, Gerold Herrmann5, in 2000 proposed the preparation of a Global Commercial 
Code.6 It is intended that the Code is a set of special rules relating to the most impor-
tant kinds of commercial transactions. One of the already existing separate interna-
tional conventions or model laws is the CISG. The CISG provides a uniform text of 
law for international sale of goods. The Convention was prepared by the UNCITRAL 
and adopted by a diplomatic conference on 11 April 1980. Currently 66 countries 
have ratified, acceded to, or otherwise adopted the CISG.7 The number is constantly 
growing. So far only seven8 of the fifty eight African states9 joined the Conven-
tion.10 Ghana signed the Convention11 but not yet set it into force. South Africa con-
siders joining the Convention.12  
 
                                                 
1 Lando, pg. 453/ Bonell, Global Commercial Code, pp. 469ff.. 
2 International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, Rome 1994, 2004, herinafter Unidroit Principles. 
3 United Nation Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, April 11, 1980, herein-
after CISG. 
4 Hereinafter UNCITRAL. 
5 Herrmann on http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell1.html (09.02.2006). 
6 Bonell: the coordination of the Unidroit Principles has followed the idea and goes even further, 
Bonell, Global Commercial Code, pg. 469. 
7 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html
  (15.11.2005). 
8 Burundi, Egypt,, Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritania, Uganda, Zambia. 
9 http://www.welt-in-zahlen.de/laenderinformation.phtml (18.11.2005). 
10 http://www.unisa.ac.za/Default.asp?Cmd=ViewContent&ContentID=658 (16.11.2005). 
11 http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html  
  (16.11.2005). 
12 The reasons for South Africa not having joined the Convention yet dates from the political 
  and historical background as well as the current development of more important law sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law established a working 
group which prepared the Unidroit Principles of International Commercial Contracts. 
The Unidroit Principles are an attempt to a progressive harmonisation of the general 
principles of contract law.13 The Principles are based on the idea, that private law can 
also be unified other than by legislative means. The idea was inspired by the Ameri-
can Restatements of the Law of Contracts, according to which the international law 
of contract was meant to be elaborated in a comparative approach, summarized and 
structured.14 Principles were to be laid down that were common to the existing na-
tional legal systems and/or which seemed best adapted to the particular needs of in-
ternational commercial contracts. As such, the aim was "to establish a balanced set of 
rules designed for use throughout the world irrespective of the legal traditions and 
the economic and political conditions of the countries in which they are to be ap-
plied."15 Although phrased as a rule of law, the Principles were deliberately not 
drafted as a convention or model law to be transformed into national law. Instead, the 
idea was to elaborate international principles of contracts without a direct binding 
force, the acceptance and application of which were exclusively dependent on its 
persuasive power and the authority of Unidroit.16
 
In 1994 the first edition of the Unidroit Principles appeared and in 2004 the second 
enlarged edition.17 The Unidroit Principles have a great influence on the world trade 
law. Parties to international commercial contracts now often agree that their contract 
shall be governed by the Unidroit Principles and the latter ones are widely applied by 
international commercial tribunals.18 The Principles have exercised considerable 
influence on modern national codes and statutes.19  It is generally acknowledged that 
together with the Principles of European Contract Law20 the Unidroit Principles are 
                                                 
13 Unidroit Principles, page xiv/ 
http://www.iue.it/LAW/ResearchTeaching/EuropeanPrivateLaw/Conferences/Lando_CISG.pdf 
(15.11.2005). 
14 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html (10.02.2006). 
15 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html (10.02.2006). 
16 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html (10.02.2006). 
17 A rather enlarged than revised edition. Zimmermann, pg. 4. 








part of a new lex mercatoria.21 The CISG has already codified a substantial part of 
the lex mercatoria.22
 
The lex mercatoria contents a list including principles as well as rules and customs.23 
It was originally a body of rules and principles laid down by merchants themselves to 
regulate their dealings.24 It consisted of usages and customs common to merchants 
and traders in Europe, with slightly local differences. It originated from the problem 
that civil law was not responsive enough to the growing demands of commerce. 
There was a need for quick and effective jurisdiction, administered by specialized 
courts. Judges were chosen according to their commercial background and practical 
knowledge. Their reputation rested upon their perceived expertise in merchant trade 
and their fair-mindedness. Gradually, a professional judiciary developed through the 
merchant judges. Their skills and reputation would however still rely upon practical 
knowledge of merchant practice. The guiding spirit of the merchant law was that it 
ought to evolve from commercial practice, respond to the needs of the merchants, 
and be comprehensible and acceptable to the merchants who submitted to it. Interna-
tional commercial law today owes some of its fundamental principles to the Law 
Merchant as it was developed in the medieval ages. This includes choice of arbitra-
tion institutions, procedures, applicable law and arbitrators, and the goal to reflect 
customs, usage and good practice among the parties.25 Today the lex mercatoria of-
ten gets involved as a source of law in questions of the applicable law in international 
business disputes.26
 
The content and scope of the thesis is to demonstrate and elaborate the coherence 
between the Unidroit Principles and the CISG. Further the focus will be on the dif-
ferences in power and impact of the Unidroit Principles and the CISG as well as the 
differences in regulating certain issues. Attention is drawn to specific regulations and 
their content and scope will be compared in order to determine the influence and help 




22 Guillemard, pg. 86. 
23 Guillemard, pg. 86. 
24 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html (02.02.2006). 
25 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lex_Mercatoria (07.01.2006).  
26 Prokati, pg.1. 
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of the Unidroit Principles to interpret the CISG and answer the question if the two 




2. Scope of application 
2. Scope of application 
In order to apply the Unidroit Principles and the CISG it is necessary to determine 
the scope of application of the Principles and the Convention. In both cases the scope 
of application is restricted by the relevant rules respectively principles.27 The regula-
tions have common elements and common fields of application such as they are ap-
plicable for contracts with international character and not to consumer contracts. But 
there are elements of application where the regulations differ. The CISG deals with a 
specific contract, the international sale of goods and the Unidroit Principles cover 
contract in general. The CISG deals with a certain number of subjects identical or 
similar to those of the Unidroit Principles and the CISG was an obligatory point of 
reference in the preparation of the Unidroit Principles.28 In the following an over-
view of the scope of application of both the Unidroit Principles and the CISG is 
given. 
 
2.1 Scope of application of the CISG 
Artt. 1 – 6 CISG determine the scope of application of the CISG. The latter provi-
sions can be divided into two groups. Artt. 1, 2, 3, and 6 lay down which contracts 
fall within the scope of the CISG. Whereas Artt. 4 and 5 determine the extent to 
which they are governed by the Convention, i.e. which parts of sales law and general 
contract law are to be governed by the CISG. The scope of application is defined by 
geographical criteria in terms of Art. 1 CISG in conjunction with Art. 10 CISG and 
substantive criteria in terms of Art. 1 (1), 3, 4, 5 CISG. The temporal scope is laid 
down by Art. 100 CISG. The geographical criteria, the places of business, are deter-
mined by application of Art. 10 (a) CISG without reference to the nationality, civil or 
commercial character of the parties or of the contract29, place of incorporation, or 
place of head office.30  
 
The articles on scope of application state both what is included in the coverage of the 
CISG and what is excluded from it. In terms of Art. 1 (1) CISG the Convention ap-
                                                 
27 This thesis does not purport to advance a conceptual debate over the notions of  “rules” and of 
“principles”. 
28 Guillemard, pg. 85. 
29 Art. 1 (3) CISG. 
30 http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#Article%201 (15.11.2005)/  
Schlechtriem, pg. 8. 
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plies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in 
different states and either both of those states are contracting states or the rules of 
private international law lead to the law of a contracting state. A few states have 
availed themselves of the authorization in Art. 95 CISG to declare that they would 
apply the Convention only in the former and not in the latter of these two situations. 
As the Convention becomes more widely adopted, the practical significance of such 
a declaration will diminish. The CISG only applies to international commercial sales 
of goods.  Each of these elements constitutes an important limitation on the scope of 
the CISG’s applicability.  The sale must be international in character.  A sale is con-
sidered "international" if it involves "parties whose places of business are in different 
states."  
 
The adoption of the CISG by countries provides important benefits.  Parties negotiat-
ing international sales contracts often find the "choice of law" issue to be among the 
most contentious.  Each party is familiar with its own domestic sales law, and prefers 
that its local rules apply to the transaction.  The CISG enables the parties to avoid 
difficulties in negotiating "whose law will govern the contract" by putting into place 
internationally accepted substantive rules on which contracting parties, courts, and 
arbitrators may rely.31
 
If both states in which the parties have their places of business are contracting states, 
the CISG provisions apply even if the international private law forum would nor-
mally designate the law of a third country such as the law of the State in which the 
contract was concluded. This result could be defeated only if the litigation took place 
in a third non-contracting state, and the rules of private international law of that state 
would apply the law of the forum, i.e., its own law, or the law of a fourth non-
contracting state to the contract.32
 
A further application of this principle is that if two parties from different States have 
chosen the law of a Contracting State as the law of the contract, the CISG is applica-
ble even though the parties have not specifically mentioned the Convention. The ba-
sic principle of contractual freedom in the international sale of goods is recognises by 
                                                 
31 http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/cisg.htm (15.11.2005). 
32 http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#Article%201 (15.11.2005). 
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Art. 6 CISG.  The provision determines the principle of party autonomy and permits 
the parties to exclude the application of the Convention (“opting out”)33 or derogate 
from or vary the effect of any of the provisions. The exclusion of the Convention 
would most often result from the choice by the parties of the law of a non-contracting 
state or of the domestic law of a contracting state to be the law applicable to the con-
tract. Derogation from the Convention would occur whenever a provision in the con-
tract provided a different rule from that found in the Convention.34
 
In addition to the possibility to exclude or vary the provisions the parties may also 
agree to the CISG even though their contract does not underlie the CISG because of 
the missing conditions of application.35 This rule however does not derive from the 
CISG itself but rather from the decisive national law and its provisions of substantial 
party autonomy.36
 
In terms of Art. 2 CISG, the Convention only applies to commercial transactions, and 
does not apply to sales of goods that are "bought for personal, family or household 
use, unless the seller, at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract, neither 
knew nor ought to have known" that the goods involved were bought for such use.  
Additionally, the CISG does not apply to the following types of sales: by auction; on 
execution or otherwise by authority of law; of stocks, shares, investment securities, 
negotiable instruments or money; of ships, vessels, hovercraft or aircraft; or of elec-
tricity. In many states some or all of such sales are governed by special rules reflect-
ing their special nature.37
 
In terms of Art. 3 CISG, the Convention distinguishes contracts of sale from con-
tracts for services in two respects. A contract for the supply of goods to be manufac-
tured or produced is considered to be a sale unless the party who orders the goods 
undertakes to supply a substantial part of the materials necessary for their manufac-
ture or production. When the preponderant part of the obligations of the party who 
                                                 
33 Schlechtriem,g. 14. 
34 Schlechtriem, pg. 14/ http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/p23.html (15.11.2005). 
35 Schlechtriem, pg. 17. 
36 Schlechtriem, pg. 17. 
37 http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/cisg.htm (15.11.2005). 
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furnishes the goods consists in the supply of labour or other services, the Convention 
does not apply.  
In particular Art. 4 CISG and several other articles make clear that the subject matter 
of the Convention is restricted to formation of the contract and the rights and duties 
of the buyer and seller arising from such a contract. In particular, the Convention is 
not concerned with the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any 
usage, the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold or in 
terms of Art. 5 CISG the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by 
the goods to any person. 
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2.2 Scope of application of the Unidroit Principles 
The Unidroit Principles constitute a major achievement in the progressive develop-
ment of international commercial law and built a solid foundation for a modern lex 
mercatoria for the international trading community.38 The Unidroit Principles best 
serve the international and national trade community with many potential uses such 
as being used as inspiration for future conventions in the contractual area, as aids in 
the interpretation of existing conventions, such as CISG, and the filling of gaps; as a 
replacement for domestic contract rules where the principles of private international 
law lead to the application of the domestic rules of a country; and as an important 
model for the introduction of domestic contract codes or the revision of existing 
codes. The purpose of application of the Unidroit Principles is determined in the Pre-
amble.  The preamble states that: 
 
“The Principles set forth general rules for international commercial contracts. They 
shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by 
them. They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be gov-
erned by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like. They may be ap-
plied when the parties have not chosen any law to govern their contract. They may 
be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law instruments. They may 
be used to interpret or supplement domestic law. They may serve as a model for na-
tional and international legislators.” 
 
Both editions, the edition of 1994 and the edition of 2004, of the Unidroit Principles 
of International Commercial Contracts are published together with comments on the 
Principles in order to interpret them. The Unidroit Principles are applicable to all 
sorts of contracts as long as the contract has an international character and is in the 
commercial field. For the international character it is only necessary to exclude situa-
tions where no international element at all is involved and therefore has to be con-
strued extensively as possible.39 Even though the Unidroit Principles are construed 
for international commercial contracts it is still in the parties’ discretion to agree on 
the Unidroit Principles for domestic contracts. The parties must only be aware that 
                                                 
38 Ziegel on http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ziegel2.html (12.05.2005). 
39 Unidroit Principles, pg. 2. 
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their contract will be subject to mandatory domestic law governing the contract.40 
The commercial element has also to be interpreted in a very broad way. The intention 
is to exclude consumer transactions in order to avoid mostly mandatory rules for con-
sumer contracts in various legal systems.41  
 
There are different ways in which the Unidroit Principles may be used. There are 
cases where the parties expressly have chosen the Unidroit Principles and there are 
cases when the Unidroit Principles might be applicable in the case of the absence of a 
choice by the parties. 
 
In the case the parties have expressly agreed on the Unidroit Principles they may 
have chosen them instead of domestic law, in conjunction with particular domestic 
law or in connection with international uniform rules.42 The problem with the choice 
of the Unidroit Principles by the parties is that the application of the Unidroit Princi-
ples will normally be considered to be a mere incorporation into the contract and the 
law governing the contract will still be determined on the basis of the private interna-
tional law rules.43 Art. 1.4 Unidroit Principles states that the Principles will only be 
binding to the parties to the extent that they do not affect the rules of the applicable 
law from which the parties may not derogate. In order to avoid the infringement of 
domestic law rules an additional arbitration agreement can be seen as a solution44 
since arbitrators are not necessarily bound by a particular domestic law.  
 
The Unidroit Principles are also applicable when the parties to the contract have 
agreed that their contract shall be governed by general principles of law, the lex mer-
catoria or the like. Parties usually agree on such rules in the case they cannot agree 
on the choice of a specific domestic law.45 Due to the vagueness of the concept it is 
highly recommended in Comment 4 b on the Unidroit Principles 2004 to have re-
course to a systematic and well-defined set of rules such as the Unidroit Principles 
instead of only referring to general principles of law, lex mercatoria or the like. 
                                                 
40 Unidroit Principles, pg. 3. 
41 Unidroit Principles, pg. 2. 
42 Bonell on http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm (17.11.2005)/ 
Unidroit Principles, pg. 3. 
43 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell96.html (06.02.2006). 
44 Unidroit Principles, pg. 3. 
45 Unidroit Principles, pg.  4. 
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In terms of Comment 4 c on the Unidroit Principles, the Unidroit Principles might be 
applicable in the absence of any choice of law by the parties in the case the dispute is 
referred to arbitration and when it can be inferred from the circumstances that the 
parties intended to exclude the application of a domestic law or when the contract 
presents connecting factors with many countries none of which is predominant 
enough to justify the application of one domestic law to the exclusion of all the oth-
ers. 
 
The Preamble further states that the Unidroit Principles may be used to interpret and 
supplement international uniform law instruments. No difficulties arise when the 
parties include an express reference to the Unidroit Principles which is very fre-
quently done.46 If there is no reference to the Unidroit Principles there is a prevailing 
opinion that international uniform law instruments shall be interpreted in accordance 
with International Principles in order not to lose the original international character. 
However the decision whether or not the Principles might be applicable is in the dis-
cretion of the judges and arbitrators. Traditionally international uniform law instru-
ments have been interpreted on the basis of, and supplemented by, principles and 
criteria of domestic law.47
 
The Unidroit Principles may also be used to supplement or interpret domestic law. In 
some cases the domestic law is burdened with disadvantages that the court or the 
arbitration tribunal is faced with doubts as to the proper solution to be adopted under 
that law.48 The reasons therefore can be that the court or arbitration tribunal has dif-
ferent alternatives and it is therefore impossible for them to establish the relevant rule 
or there might be no specific solution at all which often happens in countries with 
rudimentary legal sources.49 Further the Unidroit Principles may also be used to sub-
stitute domestic law when it is impossible or extremely difficult to establish the rele-
vant rule of that particular domestic law with respect to a specific issue, i.e. it would 
entail disproportionate efforts and/ or costs.50 In cases where the dispute relates to an 
international commercial contract the Unidroit Principles are a valuable resource in 
                                                 
46 Bonell on http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm (17.11.2005). 
47 Comment 5 on  Unidroit Principles. 
48 Comment 6 on Preamble of the Unidroit Principles.  
49 Bonell on http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm (17.11.2005). 
50 Comment 8 on Preamble of the Unidroit Principles. 
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order to interpret and supplement the applicable domestic law rules in order to serve 
the special need of the international relationship.51
 
In addition the scope of application of the Unidroit Principles is extended to being a 
model for national and international legislators. In national law the task in helping to 
develop and update foreign economic relationships could be fulfilled by the Princi-
ples when such countries lack of a developed body of legal rules or when due to 
dramatic changes in socio-political structures the country has a need to change the 
existing rules in particular the rules relating to economic and business activities.52 In 
international law the Unidroit Principles can be regarded as an important source for 
drafting of conventions and model laws in order to avoid inconsistency in the termi-
nology.53
 
2.3 The borderline between the CISG and the Unidroit Prin-
ciples 
The Unidroit Principles have to be regarded as ”soft law”54 or as private codifica-
tion55 because they do not involve Governments and therefore are not binding in-
struments and in consequence their acceptance depends upon their persuasive author-
ity.56 The Unidroit Principles are not mandatory, but rather amount to “non-
legislative instruments of harmonisation of law”57. They aim to aspire to be a model 
for national and international legislators58 and provide contracting parties with an 
international restatement of general principles of contract law. The Unidroit Princi-
ples are applicable to all kinds of international commercial contracts whereas the 
CISG´s scope of application is limited to international commercial contracts for the 
sale of goods. The crucial difference between the Unidroit Principles and the CISG is 
that the latter one is a states agreement which can be seen as one important binding 
instrument in the field of trans-national commercial law and contains the core of a 
                                                 
51 Comment 6 on Preamble of the Unidroit Principles. 
52 Comment 7 on Preamble of the Unidroit Principles. 
53 Comment 7 on Preamble of the Unidroit Principles. 
54 Bonell on http://www.unidroit.org/english/publications/review/articles/2000-2.htm (17.11.2005). 
55 Kupsch on http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:U-6t3I-
QUtQJ:www.jurawelt.com/download/studentenwelt/seminararbeiten/international/pecl.pdf+unterschie
d+un+kaufrecht+und+Unidroit+principles&hl=de (18.11.2005). 
56 Unidroit Principles, page xv. 
57 Unidroit Principles, at introduction. 
58 Guillemard, pg. 85. 
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59 Guillemard, pg. 85. 
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3. Comparable view, description and analysis of certain 
rules in the CISG and the Unidroit Principles 
In the following the specific provisions in the CISG and in the Unidroit Principles 
will be compared. Both sets of rule appear to be extremely successful. To same ex-
tend, as discussed before they have the same scope of application and it has to be 
investigated how and to what extend they differ or may be co-exist and possibly even 
support each other in practise. 
 
3.1 Formation of contracts 
The second part of the CISG, Artt. 14ff., regulates the formation of sale contracts. 
The CISG does not refer to the pre-contractual phase60 and therefore takes an abbre-
viated approach beginning with descriptions and definitions of offer61 and acceptan-
ce62.63 The rules regarding the pre-contractual phase only belong partly to the rules 
covering the sales law. As far as the pre-contractual obligations concentrate on pro-
tecting the goods of the other party it has to be regarded as part of the non-
contractual liability.64 However where pre-contractual obligations regarding the as-
surance of the conclusion of the contract65 are concerned they have to be regarded as 
factual issues regulated in the regulations in the CISG regarding breach of contract, 
liability for goods conforming to the contract or the regulations regarding the cancel-
lation of the contract in terms of Art. 72 CISG.66  
 
In the CISG a contract is formed when the parties agreed on two concurrent declara-
tions of intent in succession, offer and acceptance.67 It is assumed that the declara-
tions were executed and can be determined, even in a long negotiation process. For a 
valid offer is it compulsory that the proposal was sent to one or more specific persons 
and that the offeror intended to be bound to the eventual contract in the case of ac-
ceptance. It is not necessary that he intends to be bound by the offer, i.e. that he in-
                                                 
60 Schlechtriem, pg. 58. 
61 Artt. 14-17 CISG. 
62 Artt. 18-22 CISG. 
63 Guillemard , pg. 87. 
64 EuGH of 2002.09.17, NJW 2002, 3159: Gerichtsstand der unerlaubten Handlung für Ansprüche aus 
culpa in contrahendo. 
65 E.g. cancellation of contract negotiations, nature of the goods, etc.. 
66 Schlechtriem pg. 58. 
67 Artt 14-24 CISG. 
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tends the offer to be irrevocable.68 There are no particular words which must be used 
to indicate such an intention; therefore it may sometimes require a careful examina-
tion of the offer in order to determine whether such an intention existed. The offer 
has clearly to be distinguished from other declarations and especially has to be dif-
ferentiated from the invitatio ad offerendum. This is particularly true if one party 
claims that a contract was concluded during negotiations which were carried on over 
an extended period of time, and no single communication was termed by the parties 
as an offer or as an acceptance. Whether there is the requisite intention to be bound 
in case of acceptance will be established in accordance with the rules of interpreta-
tion in terms of Art. 8 CISG.69
 
The rules regarding the formation of contract in the Unidroit Principles are stipulated 
in Chapter 2, section 1. Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles determines that a contract may 
be concluded either by the acceptance of an offer or by the conduct of the parties 
which is sufficient to show agreement. In terms of Art. 3.2 Unidroit Principles a con-
tract is concluded by the mere agreement of the parties without any further require-
ment. This is on of the basic ideas of the Principles.70 Offer and acceptance are used 
to determinate whether or not the parties have reached agreement.71  
 
Same as in the CISG it is recognized that it is not always clear if a contractual 
agreement was reached by the parties, especially in the case the parties negotiated 
over a long time. Even though the moment of the formation of the contract might not 
be determinable a contract can be held concluded if the conduct of the parties suffi-
ciently shows agreement, e.g. when the parties start to perform.72 The parties’ inten-
tion to be bound by the contract and the conduct of the party has to be interpreted in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in Art. 4.1 ff. Unidroit Principles.73 An illustra-
tion hereof can be found in Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. Two parties 
enter into negotiations with the goal in mind to set up a joint venture. The parties 
begin to perform but there was neither a determinable offer nor an acceptance and a 
                                                 
68 Art. 14 CISG revocability of an offer.  
69 http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#Article%2012 (10.01.2006)/ 
Schlechtriem, pg. 59. 
70 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. 
71 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. 
72 Comment 2 and 3 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. 
73 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. 
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few minor points had not been settled. Subsequently the parties fail to reach agree-
ment on these minor points but a court or arbitral tribunal may decide that a contract 
was nevertheless concluded since the parties had begun to perform, thereby showing 
their intention to be bound by a contract.74  
 
The article on manner of formation also includes automated contracting. In the case 
e.g. an automobile manufacturer and a components supplier set up an electronic data 
interchange system which, as soon as the stocks of the manufacturer of components 
fall below a certain level, automatically generates orders for the components and 
executes such orders. The fact that the parties have agreed on the operation of such a 
system makes the orders and performances binding to the parties, even though they 
have been generated without the personal intervention of the manufacturer and sup-
plier.75 This illustration shows that the article of the Unidroit Principles for the man-
ner of formation of contracts is very broad and anxious to cover practical advanced 
situations of everyday business life. 
 
Artt. 14ff. CISG very clearly show symptoms of old age. Very important practical 
issues in connection with the formation of contracts are left open as a comparison 
with chapter 2 of the Unidroit Principles shows.76 However there is no doubt that 
gaps regarding matters which where not dealt with in the CISG due to the later tech-
nical development for e.g. communication instruments will be filled by analogy in 
terms of Art. 7 (2) CISG.77  The drafters of the Unidroit Principles had the advantage 
in including these matters since e.g. the technical advanced communication instru-
ments were already common and showed the first problems which might occur when 
using them. 
 
3.1.1 Withdrawal of offer and acceptance 
Art. 15 (1) CISG provides that an offer becomes effective when it reaches the of-
feree. Art. 18 (2) CISG provides that an acceptance of an offer becomes effective at 
the moment the indication of assent reaches the offeror […]. Art. 15 (2) CISG deals 
                                                 
74 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. 
75 Comment 3 on Art. 2.1.1 Unidroit Principles. 
76 Schlechtriem, pg. 56. 
77 Art. 13 CISG will be analogue used for communication via fax or e-mail. Schlechtriem, pg. 45. 
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with the withdrawal of an offer by an offeror78 and Art. 22 CISG deals with the with-
drawal of an acceptance by an offeree. As such the CISG provides the parties with 
the opportunity to permissibly withdraw an offer, respectively an acceptance of an 
offer. The withdrawal of the offer, respectively the withdrawal of the acceptance of 
the offer, must reach the offeree, respectively the offeror, before or at the same time 
as the offer, respectively the acceptance, would have become effective. Both arti-
cles79 provide a rule on the timing for an effective withdrawal. These provisions 
must be analyzed in the context of the basic rule of the CISG that an offer or an ac-
ceptance can not be withdrawn after it has become effective. Art. 22 CISG comple-
ments the rule in Art. 23 CISG, that a contract is concluded at the moment when an 
acceptance of an offer becomes effective. Regarding the application of Art. 22 CISG 
it has been noted that, by permitting an effective withdrawal of an acceptance, it cre-
ates the opportunity for an offeree to perhaps speculate about the expense of the of-
feror.80 That problem is likely to arise mainly where traditional means of communi-
cation have been used by the parties. For instance, an offeree who may have sent an 
acceptance by ordinary paper mail may later withdraw it by sending a notice of with-
drawal using a faster method of transmission81 that reaches the offeror before the 
ordinary mail.  
 
The Unidroit Principles provide a similar regime for the effective withdrawal of an 
offer82 and the withdrawal of an acceptance of an offer83. It is a similar provision 
dealing with the timing for an effective withdrawal of an offer by an offeror and the 
withdrawal of an acceptance by an offeree. The wording of the Unidroit provisions 
Artt. 2.1.3 and 2.1.10 are completely identical to that used in its counterpart provi-
sions of the CISG Art. 2.1.3 (1) Unidroit Principles is literally taken from Art. 15 
CISG.84 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.3 Unidroit Principles refers to Art. 1.10 (3) Unidroit 
Principles for the definition of “reaches”.  In practice there is another reason for 
which it might be very important to determine the moment at which the offer be-
                                                 
78 The CISG very clearly distinguishes between the withdrawal of an offer if the withdrawal reaches 
the offeree before or at the same time as the offer in Art. 15 (2) CISG and the revocation if the revoca-
tion reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance in Art. 16 CISG. 
79 Artt. 15(2), 22 CISG. 
80 Felemegas on http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/principles/uni22.html#ed (10.02.2006). 
81 E.g. fax or email. 
82 Art. 2.1.3 Unidroit Principles. 
83 Art. 2.1.10 Unidroit Principles. 
84 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.3 Unidroit Principes. 
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comes effective.85 Up to the moment the offer becomes effective the offeror is free to 
change its mind and to decide not to enter into the agreement at all, or to replace the 
original offer by a new one, irrespectively of whether or not the original offer was 
intended to be irrevocable. There is only one condition the offeror has to fulfil, the 
offeree has to be informed of the offeror’s altered intentions before or at the time as 
the offeree is informed of the original offer. By expressly stating this in the article, it 
is made clear that a distinction is to be drawn between ‘withdrawal” and ‘revocation’ 
of an offer. The possibility to revoke an offer arises only after that moment.86 Fur-
thermore, based on the similar regime for offers and acceptances and the same policy 
adopted in the CISG and the Unidroit Principles to permit an effective withdrawal of 
an offer and acceptance of an offer, it can be concluded that the counterpart provi-
sions regarding withdrawal of an offer and acceptance of an offer are substantively 
identical. Thus it is arguable that the official Unidroit Comments on Art. 2.1.10, 
which recognizes that the offeree enjoys his freedom of choice to enter a contract 
longer than the offeror,87 helps to interpret the meaning of the provision contained in 
Art. 22 CISG. 
 
3.1.2 Revocation of an offer 
In countries such as Belgium, Austria, Greece, Portugal and Germany an offer is 
binding when it reaches the offeree, in Nordic law when it comes to ones knowl-
edge.88 In general an offer can only be revoked if it shows that it is revocable. How-
ever, many law systems will allow a party to revoke his offer before it has been ac-
cepted.89 This is also the rule in Art. 16 (1) CISG and in Art. 2.1.4 Unidroit Princi-
ples.  
 
Art. 16 (1) CISG stipulates that until a contract is concluded an offer may be revoked 
if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an acceptance. In terms 
of Art. 16 (2) CISG there are two exceptions. An offer cannot be revoked (i) if it in-
dicates, whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevo-
cable; or (ii) if it it reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable 
                                                 
85 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.3 Unidroit Principes 
86 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.3 Unidroit Principes. 
87 Comment on Art. 2.1.10 Unidroit Principles. 
88 Lando, pg. 459. 
89 Lando, pp. 459f.. 
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and the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer. The solution of the CISG has to be 
regarded as a compromise solution that in terms of Art. 16 (1) CISG in general an 
offer is revocable and that in terms of Art. 16 (2) CISG the offeror is bound in certain 
cases.90 There are situations where it is reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer 
as being irrevocable, and where the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer.91 In 
such cases it should also not be revocable and the CISG provision is drafted in ac-
cordance with these considerations.92 An illustration hereof would be in the case a 
contractor gets a sub-contractor to submit an offer, which the contractor then uses in 
his bid for a constructions contract, the subcontractor should not be permitted to re-
voke his offer.93 A reader of Art. 16 (2) (a) CISG could receive the impression that 
the fixing of a time for the acceptance of an offer would always make it irrevocable, 
however that can not be seen as the common interpretation of the intention of the 
provision.94 The provision is not universally agreed on. Delegates from the common 
law would not accept that the fixing of a time for acceptance should make the offer 
automatically irrevocable while the delegates from the civil law countries would. The 
formulation used in Art. 16 (2) (a) CISG avoided to face the problem and it seems 
that the outcome is that whether the offer is irrevocable or not depends upon the in-
tention of the offeror as it was reasonably understood by the offeree.95 In practice 
this menas that the offer is irrevocable where the offeror and the offeree both are 
from civil law countries where the stating of a fixed time for acceptance alone makes 
the offer irrevocable. In contrast the offer may be revocable where both parties are 
from common law countries, where the stating of a fixed period for acceptance alone 
does not make the offer irrevocable. Where the offeror comes from a common law 
country and the offeree from a civil law country the solution has to be found in line 
with Art. 8 (1) CISG and therefore will depend upon whether the offeree knew or 
could not have been unaware of the offeror’s intention not to be bound by the offer. 
If not, the solution will in terms of Art. 8 (2) CISG depend upon the understanding of 
a reasonable person of the same kind as the offeree which might be unclear.96
 
                                                 
90 Schlechtriem, pg. 64. 
91 Lando, pg. 459. 
92 Lando, pg 460. 
93 Example taken from Lando. 
94 Lando, pg 459. 
95 Art. 8 CISG / Lando, pg 460. 
96 Lando, pg. 460./ Schlechtriem in von Caemmerer & Schlechtriem, pg. 154 f. 
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A further possibility to be bound is regulated in Art. 16 (2) (b) CISG. If it was rea-
sonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the offeree has 
acted in reliance on the offer. This rule contains a general principle known as “estop-
pel” and can play an important role for the filling of gaps in terms of Art. 7 (2) 
CISG.97 Both misfeasance and nonfeasance are included in the provision.98
 
In terms of Art. 2.1.4 Unidroit Principles an offer may be revoked until a contract is 
concluded if the revocation reaches the offeree before the offeree has dispatched an 
acceptance. The exceptions hereof are stipulated in Art. 2.1.4 (2) Unidroit Principles 
and as same worded as Art. 16 (2) CISG. 
 
The Unidroit Principles determination shares the same background with the CISG 
provision in this regard and is seen as one of the most controversial issues in the con-
text of the formation of contracts.99 The common law regimes approach that an offer 
is as a rule revocable whereas the most civil law countries have the contrary ap-
proach and would only allow revoking an offer in exceptional circumstances.100 As a 
rule Art. 16 CISG and Art. 2.1.4. (1) Unidroit Principle state that until the contract is 
concluded offers are revocable under the condition that the revocation reaches the 
offeree before the offeree has dispatched his acceptance.101 In the event the offeree 
orally accepts the offer or when the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act 
without giving notice to the offeror, the offeror’s right to revoke the offer continues 
to exist until such time as the contract is concluded.102 However when the offer is 
accepted by a written indication of assent, the contract is concluded when the accep-
tance reaches the offeror, the offeror’s right to revoke the offer terminates earlier, i.e. 
when the offeree dispatches the acceptance.103 On the one hand in practice this solu-
tion might cause some inconvenience to the offeror who will not always know 
whether or not it is still possible for him to revoke the offer but on the other hand it is 
                                                 
97 Schlechtriem, pg. 64. 
98 Schlechtriem, pg. 64. 
99 Comment on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
100 Comment on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
101 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
102 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
103 Comment 1 Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
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justified in the view of the legitimate interest of the offeree in the time available for 
the revocation being shortened.104
 
Same as Art. 16 (2) (a) CISG, the Unidroit Principles also consider the different ap-
proach regarding the indication of an offer to be irrevocable and inter alia follows the 
same solution that regards has to be given to the legal background of the parties.105 
In the Illustration 2 on comment 2 on Art. 2.1.4 Unidroit Principles the situation is 
demonstrated that A invites B to submit a written offer of the terms on which B is 
prepared to construct a building. B presents a detailed offer containing the statement 
"Price and other conditions are not good after 1 September". If A and B operate 
within a legal system where such a statement is considered to be an indication that 
the offer is irrevocable until the specified date, B can expect the offer to be under-
stood as being irrevocable. The same may not necessarily be the case if the offeree 
operates in a legal system where such a statement is not considered as being suffi-
cient to indicate that the offer is irrevocable.106  
 
The second exception stipulated in Art. 2.1.4 (2) (b) Unidroit Principles is an appli-
cation of the general principle prohibiting inconsistent behaviour laid down in Art. 
1.8 Unidroit Principles107.108 The reasonable reliance of the offeree can be evoked 
either by the conduct of the offeror or by the nature of the offer itself.109 A case for 
the reasonable reliance of the offeree due to the nature of the offer could be in the 
case an offer whose acceptance requires extensive and costly investigation on the 
part of the offeree or an offer made with a view to permitting the offeree in turn to 
make an offer to a third party.110 Illustrations hereof are made in the comment on 
Art. 2.1.4 Unidroit Principles. One example is the case were A seeks an offer from B 
for incorporation in a bid on a project to be assigned within a stated time. B submits 
an offer on which A relies when calculating the price of the bid. Before the expiry of 
the date, but after A has made the bid, B informs A that it is no longer willing to 
                                                 
104 Comment 1 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
105 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
106 Comment  2 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
107 Art. 1.8 Unidroit Principles states: A party cannot act inconsistently with an understanding it has 
caused the other party to have and upon which that other party reasonably has acted in reliance to its 
detriment. 
108 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
109 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
110 Comment 2 on Art. 2.1.4. Unidroit Principles. 
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stand by its offer. B’s offer is irrevocable until the stated date since in making its bid 
A relied on B’s offer. 
 
The rules in the CISG as well as in the Unidroit Principles regarding revocable offers 
are criticized to be very unclear and cause legal uncertainty.111 Both rules do not 
constitute a satisfactory solution in terms of international trade. One of the major 
aims of the CISG is promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good 
faith in international trade.112 Art. 1.6 Unidroit Principles state that in the interpreta-
tion of these Principles, regard is to be had to their international character and to their 
purposes including the need to promote uniformity in their application. The solutions 
found for the revocation of an offer is conflictive with the CISG as well as the 
Unidroit Principels.. 
 
3.2 Interest on delayed payment 
The only provision of the CISG on this issue is Art. 78 which provides ‘If a party 
fails to pay the price or any other sum that is in arrears, the other party is entitled to 
interest on it, without prejudice to any claim for damages recoverable under article 
74’. The rule mentions neither the rate of interest to be charged nor over what period 
of time it is payable. The question regarding interest caused difficulties at the Vienna 
Conference. The applications and suggestions reflected different opinions due to the 
different needs. For example some Islamist countries forbid the charging of interest 
on religious grounds or for reasons of public policy, which was one of the major rea-
sons that prevented agreement on these issues.113 Other states regarded specific rules 
for interest as unnecessary because there is a possibility to claim damage in the case 
of missed out use of capital.114 In contrast, other states regarded specific interest 
regulations as very important and did not want interest to be regarded as damage.115 
It was especially impossible to find a solution for the rate of interest.116 In the case 
the courts have to apply the CISG it is almost always necessary for them to deal with 
Art. 78 CISG, because regularly it is claimed for the sales price plus interest or dam-
                                                 
111 Lando, pg  460. 
112 Art. 7 (1) CISG. 
113 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/akaddaf.html (07.02.2006)/ Schlechtriem, pg. 204. 
114 Schlechtriem, pg. 204. 
115 Schlechtriem, pg. 204. 
116 Schlechtriem, pg. 205. 
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age plus interest.117 It is commonly assured that the duty to pay interest starts at the 
time the payment is due to the time of payment whereas the rate of interest is debat-
able. In terms of the determination of the rate of interest no uniform opinion exists. 
Some Commentators suggested filling the gap in terms of Art. 7 (2) CSIG.118 The 
International Court of Arbitration on 01.01.1993 filled the gap in terms of Art. 7 (2) 
CISG applying LIBOR119 as the decisive rate of interest.120 Contrary commenta-
tors121 however state that it is impossible to fill the gap in terms of Art. 7 (2) CISG 
for the reason that the majority of the delegates at the Vienna Conference dismissed a 
specific regulation regarding the rate of interest and therefore a recourse to national 
law is decisive.122 However the commentators even differ here about the determina-
tion of the applicable law for the rate of interest. Courts and a few commentators are 
of the opinion that the applicable law for the calculation of the rate of interest must 
not necessarily be the applicable law to the contract. They rather recommend that the 
law of the place of the obligee is decisive arguing that the right to interest is similar 
to the claim for damage.123 Other commentators state that the law of the place of the 
obligor is decisive because the obligor unjustifiable used the restrained goods and 
therefore the unjust enrichment was received at the place of the obligor.124 A further 
observation is that the law which was agreed on for the currency or the law of the 
place of payment can be decisive for the determination of the rate of interest.125  
Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles provides that  
(1) ‘If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the aggrieved party 
is entitled to interest upon that sum from the time when payment is due to the 
time of payment whether or not the non-payment is excused. 
(2) The rate of interest shall be the average bank short-term lending rate to prime 
borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at the place for payment, or 
where no such rate exists at that place, then the same rate in the State of the 
                                                 
117 Ziegel on http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ziegel2.html (12.05.2005). 
118 Based on the Principle of Full Compensation, see 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ulr96.html (15.01.2006)/Schlechtriem, pg. 205. 
119 London Inter Bank Offered Rate. 
120 ICC case no. 6653/1993, CISG-online Nr. 71/ C.f. Schlechtriem, pg. 205. 
121 E.g. Frigge, pg.79/ Schlechtriem, pg. 46,205. 
122 Farnsworth, pg 570. 
123 Awards of the International Arbitration Court of the Union Chamber for the Industrial Economy in 
Austria of 15.06.1994, Cisg-online Nr. 120 and 121. 
124 Neumayer/ Ming. 
125 Schlechtriem, pg. 206. 
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currency of payment. In the absence of such rate at either place the rate of in-
terest shall be the appropriate rate fixed by the law of the State of the cur-
rency of payment. 
(3) The aggrieved party is entitled to additional damages if the non-payment 
caused greater harm.’ 
By expressly stating that the right to interest is independent of whether or not the 
non-payment of the sum of money due is excused, provides an answer to a question 
which Art. 78 CISG leaves open.126 Even for the delay caused by force majeure in-
terest has to be paid, not as damages but as compensation for the enrichment of the 
debtor as a result of the non-payment as the debtor continues to receive interest on 
the sum which it is prevented from paying.127 The parties may of course agree in 
advance on a different rate of interest which would in effect subject it to Art. 7.4.13 
Unidroit Principles.128
7.4.9 (2) Unidroit Principles fixes in the first instance as the rate of interest the aver-
age bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers. This solution is regarded to be 
that best suited to the needs of international trade and most appropriate to ensure an 
adequate compensation of the harm sustained.129 The rate in question has to be calcu-
lated as the rate at which the aggrieved party will normally borrow the money which 
it has not received from the non-performing party.130 That normal rate is the average 
bank short-term lending rate to prime borrowers prevailing at the place for payment 
for the currency of payment.131 If no such rate however exists for the currency at the 
place for payment, the Unidroit Principles provide additional tools to determine the 
rate of interest either by an average prime rate in the state of the currency of payment 
or an appropriate rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency of payment.132
7.4.9 (3) Unidroit Principles states that additional damage is recoverable for the rea-
son that interest is intended to compensate the harm sustained as a consequence of 
delay in payment of a sum of money. Such delay may however cause additional harm 
                                                 
126 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html#mjb69 (01.01.2006). 
127 Comment 1 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
128 Comment 1 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
129 Comment 2 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
130 Comment 2 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
131 Comment 2 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
132 Comment 2 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
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to the aggrieved party for which it may recover damages.133 An illustration hereof is 
given in the case if A concludes a contract with B, a specialized finance company, 
for a loan which will permit the renovation of its factory in Singapore. The loan spe-
cifically mentions the use of the funds. The money lent is transferred three months 
later than agreed. During that period the cost of the renovation has increased by ten 
percent. A is entitled to recover this additional sum from B.134
Further the Unidroit Principles in Art. 7.4.10 provides a rule on the interest on dam-
ages for non-performance of non-monetary obligations. It is provided that unless 
otherwise agreed, interest on such damage accrues as from the time of non-
performance. 
 
3.3 Price as an essential term of the contract 
In the CISG it is difficult to find the prevailing perception regarding the determina-
tion of, respectively the agreement on the price as an essential term of the contract. 
This issue in finalizing the CISG at the conference in Vienna in 1980 was seen as 
very difficult and almost foundered the establishment of the regulations.135 The rea-
son therefore was that France and other civil law jurisdictions such as the former 
Soviet Union and various less developed countries following the Code Napoleon 
tradition regarded the agreement on the price as an essential term of the contract 
whereas common law jurisdictions and other civil law and mixed jurisdictions fa-
voured a more flexible approach.136 Art. 14 (1) CISG adopted the French rule. Art. 
14 CISG adopts the same rule in respect of the price that it does in respect of quan-
tity. Thus, for the proposal to constitute an offer it must expressly or implicitly fix or 
make provision for the price. In the final stages of the Vienna conference, after long 
discussions, Art. 55 CISG was adopted as a compromise solution but without delet-
ing Art. 14 CISG. Art. 14 (2) sentence 2 CISG and Art. 55 CISG are inconsistent 
because under the latter provision a contract gets into being without the fulfilment of 
the condition that the parties determined the price. In fact Art. 14 (1) CISG does nei-
ther forbid a silent determination of the price nor an implied determination of the 
                                                 
133 Comment 3on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
134 Comment 3 on Art. 7.4.9 Unidroit Principles. 
135 Ziegel on http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ziegel2.html (12.05.2005). 
136 Ziegel on http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ziegel2.html (12.05.2005)/ Schlechtriem, pg. 
60.  
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price. Therefore very often negotiations or customs between the parties open the way 
to supplements of the offer due to a fixed price or a price which can be determined.  
Where the buyer sends an order for goods listed in the seller's catalogue or where he 
orders spare parts, he may decide to make no specification of the price at the time of 
placing the order. This may occur because he does not have a price list of the seller 
or he may not know whether the price list he has is current. Nevertheless, it may be 
implicit in his action of sending the order that he is offering to pay the price currently 
being charged by the seller for such goods. If such is the case, the buyer has implic-
itly made provision for the determination of the price and his order for the goods 
would constitute an offer. Similarly, where the buyer orders goods from a catalogue 
for future delivery it may be implicit in his order and from other relevant circum-
stances that the buyer is offering to pay the price currently being charged by the 
seller at the time of the delivery. In order to determine whether a proposal implicitly 
fixes or makes provision for determining the price it is necessary to interpret the pro-
posal in the light of Art. 7 CISG.137
The OGH138 held in terms of Art. 8 II CISG that in order to accept an offer it is suffi-
cient if a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party would have had inter-
preted in the same way in the same circumstances. In terms of Art. 8 III CISG the 
determination of the intent of a party or the understanding of a reasonable person 
would have had, due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the 
case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established be-
tween themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties. In specific it 
has to be paid attention to the negotiations between the parties, the customs and the 
later behaviour between them. In conclusion it is possible to have a silent determina-
tion and a mere agreement which makes it possible to specify the price or the quan-
tity of the goods.139 The decision was based on the following case. 
 
In the case of a sales contract between parties situated in Germany and Austria a 
price was determined within the range of 35 and 65 DM140 for Chinchilla furs. The 
offence against the validity of the contract, due to the missing determination of the 
                                                 
137 http://www.cisg-online.ch/cisg/materials-commentary.html#Article%2012 (10.01.2006). 
138 OGH=Supreme Court. 
139 OGH of 10.11.1994, CISG-online Nr. 117 = JBI 1995, 253-254 m. Anm. Karollus. 
140 DM= Deutsche Mark (former German currency). 
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price, failed. The price must be determined either explicitly or silently, respectively it 
must be possible to determine the price. In terms of Art. 14 I CISG a silent determi-
nation is possible. With a silent determination it is meant a sign which makes it pos-
sible to interpret and to guide to a specific price. But it is sufficient when the price is 
determinable. This criterion is fulfilled when the parties silently refer to a price 
which is determinable without recourse to facts which lead to the price determina-
tion. In the foregoing case the parties sufficiently agreed on a price range of 35 to 65 
DM for fur of middle to good quality. Depending on the quality of the fur a specific 
price can be determined. This determination of the price is regarded as sufficient in 
terms of Art. 14 I CISG. Therefore the sales contract got into being with a determin-
able price. 
 
Moreover the requirement of a determined or determinable price has to be regarded 
as set aside in terms of Art. 6 CISG if the parties carried out a contract or if it is clear 
from their behaviour that they intend to enter into a binding contract. A binding con-
tract between the parties is concluded and the criterion of the missing specification of 
the price has to be regarded as in terms of Art. 55 CISG.141
 
In the case Pratt & Whitney v. Malev Airlines142, with the application of Art. 14 I (2) 
CISG, the danger arose that through a very narrow interpretation of the provision the 
Supreme Court of Hungary held that the contract is not valid. The reasons therefore 
are not clear. In the case the American producer of aircraft engines Pratt & Whitney 
offered engines and engine systems for the rebuilding of old machines and for new 
airbuses which have to be new acquisitioned by the Hungarian Airline Malev. In the 
supporting documents which were delivered by Pratt & Whitney the prices for many 
but not for all engines and engine systems were determined. The offer of Pratt & 
Whiteney was open for a limited period of time and one day before the expiry date of 
the offer Malev accepted the offer via Telex for a specific engine for the basic 
equipment, further they stated that they look forward to a good business relationship. 
Later however Malev informed Pratt & Whitney that they decided to prefer the Rolls 
Roys Turbines. The first instance decided that a binding contract got into force be-
tween Pratt & Whitney and Malev, however the Hungarian Supreme Court held that 
                                                 
141 Schlechtriem, pg. 62. 
142 Decision of 25.09.1992, CISG-online Nr. 63, also VIDA, Iprax 1995, 261ff. 
27 
3. Comparable view of the CISG and the Unidroit Principles 
no binding acceptance and therefore no contract got into force on the grounds that by 
the chosen engines the specification was missing, respectively the determination of 
the price was not given and therefore for such engines no price determination was 
possible in terms of Art. 55 CISG. It is not to judge if through the negotiations of the 
parties the price for the specific engine is determinable. An American commenta-
tor143 while analyzing the case has spoken from Hometown Justice. He dramatically 
concerned herewith the question whether or not domestic party is favoured when 
interpreting Art. 14 I 2 CISG too narrowly.144
 
The Unidroit Principles does not require the offer to contain reference to the price. In 
terms of Art. 2.1.2 Unidroit Principles a proposal for concluding a contract consti-
tutes an offer if it is sufficiently defined and indicates the intention of the offeror to 
be bound in case of acceptance. The comment on Definiteness of an offer in Art. 
2.1.2 Unidroit Principles state that even essential terms such as the precise descrip-
tion of the goods or the services to be delivered or rendered, the price to be paid for 
them, the time or place of performance, etc., may be left undetermined in the offer 
without necessarily rendering it insufficiently definite. The decisive thing is whether 
both parties intended to make a contract, and whether the missing terms can be de-
termined by interpreting the language in accordance with the rules on interpreta-
tion145 or supplied in accordance with the rules on supplementation146. 
 
3.4 Force majeure 
In general a party is bound to perform its obligation under the contract even though it 
has become more onerous.147 This principle means that each party to an agreement is 
responsible for its non-execution, even if the cause of the failure is beyond his power 
and was not or could not be foreseen at the time of signing the agreement.148 In prac-
tice the importance to this principle has to be emphasised since effective economic 
activity is not possible without reliable promises. The two major legal terms/ charac-
ters dealing with the problem of changed circumstances are those of force majeure 
                                                 
143 Amato, pg. 16ff. 
144 Schlechtriem, pg. 63. 
145 Art. 4.1 ff. Unidroit Principles.  
146 E.g. Art. 5.1.7 Unidroit Principles Price determination. 
147 Pacta sunt servanda. 
148 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html (17.01.2006) referring to Puelinckx, p.g. 47. 
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and hardship. The concept of force majeure, providing for the discharge of one or 
both parties when a contract has become impossible to perform, has evolved progres-
sively in international trade practice by assuming many original and autonomous 
features distinct from similar legal concepts.149 There exist various definitions for the 
term force majeure. The following is a possible definition. 
  
‘Force majeure occurs when the law recognizes that without default of either party a 
contractual obligation has become incapable of being performed because the cir-
cumstances in which the performance is called for would render it impossible. I 
promised to do this but I cannot due to some irresistible unforeseeable and uncon-
trollable event.’150
 
In the case of force majeure151 an exception of the general rule pacta sunt servanda 
is made in most legal systems although the rules are not the same in all legal systems 
they all show the following main feature.152 If a performance has become impossible 
in law or fact the debtor is relieved from his obligation. Some legal systems even go 
further and allow relief of the duty to perform also in the case of quasi impossibili-
ty153.154  
 
Under the CISG, any party that fails to perform its contractual obligations may be 
liable to the other party for damages. However, under certain extraordinary circum-
stances, a party's obligation to perform may be excused if an unforeseen and un-
avoidable impediment, beyond the non-performing party's control, obstructed per-
formance. It states in Art. 79 (1) CISG that ‘a party is not liable to perform any of its 
obligations if it proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond its control 
and that it could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into ac-
count at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it 
                                                 
149 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html (17.01.2006) referring to Draetta, pg. 547. 
150 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/rimke.html (17.01.2006) referring to Puelinckx, pg. 50. 
151 Alternative definition: An overwhelming force of nature having unavoidable consequences that 
under certain circumstances can exempt one from the obligation. [Synonyms: Latin vīs māior : vīs, 
force + māior, greatervis major, act of god, unavoidable accident] 
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/dictionaries/difficultwords/data/d0013615.html (17.01.2006)/ ‘The 
words force majeure could cover the dislocation of a business due to a universal coal strike or acci-
dents to machinery, but would not cover bad weather, football matches, or a funeral’ c.f. Brauer and 
Co. v. James Clark, 1952 W.N. 422 (Eng. 1952). 
152 Lando, pg. 464. 
153 The obligation in general is possible but cannot be requested in the specific case. 
154 Lando, pg. 464 
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or its consequences.’ This provision makes it possible to exculpate from the duty to 
perform under the contract in certain circumstances under the condition not being 
responsible for the breach of duty.155 In general it is assumed that the debtor is re-
sponsible for the breach of duty and therefore it is the onus of the debtor to proof the 
contrary.156 In the case of force majeure the failure to perform is beyond the control 
of the debtor however it has to be distinguished from cases where the debtor guaran-
teed his performance. Guaranteed performances include situations where the debtor 
has influence in the fulfilling of its obligation and neglected to do so.157 The debtor is 
liable for the breach of his duty even if the failure was due to an impediment beyond 
his control when it was reasonably to be expected at the time of conclusion of the 
contract or when it existed at the time of the conclusion of the contract. There are 
contrary opinions regarding the case whether or not initial impediment to perform-
ance shall be covered by Art. 79 (1) CISG.158 If it is not included in the applicability 
of Art. 79 CISG, the question arises if and how the debtor can exculpate his duty to 
perform. The following possibilities would exist under the CISG. There could be no 
possibility for the debtor and he would be liable for warranty159, the filling of gaps in 
terms of Art. 7 (2) CISG through recourse to applicable national law or the filling of 
gaps on grounds of the general principles160 on which the Convention is based.161
 
In drafting Art. 79 CISG, they failed to resolve several important issues. For in-
stance, Art. 79 CISG does not state whether an impediment excuses performance 
entirely if partial performance is possible. However, if a party can perform in part, 
then it should not be wholly excused from its obligation to perform; it should only be 
excused for the part of the contract it cannot perform. Also the excuse of "any obliga-
tion" by Art. 79 CISG rather than excuse of "contract performance" suggests that 
performance is required to the extent possible. Furthermore, the CISG drafters dealt 
with partial performance explicitly in several other provisions; thus, the drafters 
probably did not intend an "all or nothing" approach for Art. 79 CISG. In addition, 
Art. 79 CISG does not state whether a party must accept performance once the im-
                                                 
155 Schlechtriem, pg 183. 
156 Schlechtriem, pg 183. 
157 Schlechtriem, pg 185. 
158 Schlechtriem, pg. 185 (+), Fischer, pg. 249 (-). 
159 Schlechtriem, pg. 185. 
160 There are no general principles known to the author which could be applicable. 
161 Schlechtriem, pg. 185. 
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pediment passes and the excused party's obligation to perform is reinstated. For ex-
ample, suppose that a seller was excused from the obligation to perform because of 
an impediment but seven months later the seller is capable of performing. Art. 79 
CISG makes it clear that the seller must perform, but the question whether or not the 
buyer is still obligated to perform in left open. Art. 79 CISG does not resolve this 
issue directly. Under Art. 79(5) CISG, however, the buyer retains the right to avoid 
the contract for a fundamental breach. If the buyer avoids the contract, then its duty 
to take delivery should be discharged. However, if the buyer does not avoid the con-
tract, the seller could point out that the duty to take delivery impliedly is not dis-
charged. Thus, the buyer is obligated to perform unless the seller's delay amounts to 
a fundamental breach.162
 
The similar correspondent rule in the Unidroit Principles is Art. 7.1.7. The term force 
majeure was chosen, even though it is not identical, for the reason that it is widely 
known in international trade practice.163 In common law systems it is known as the 
doctrines of frustration and impossibility of performance and in civil law systems by 
doctrines such as force majeure and Unmöglichkeit.164 The definition of force ma-
jeure in the Unidroit Principles is necessarily of a rather general character and inter-
national commercial contracts mostly contain much more elaborate and precise pro-
visions.165 It is therefore recommended to contracting parties to adapt the content of 
the Unidroit provision so as to take account of the particular features of the specific 
transaction.166  
 
Art. 7.1.7 (2) Unidroit Principles deals with the case of a temporary impediment 
which will delay performance. In this case extra time is given to fulfil performance. 
It has to be noted that in this event the extra time may be greater or less than the 
length of the interruption because it will be determined by the effect of the interrup-
tion on the progress of the contract as the following illustration shows. One party 
contracts to lay a natural gas pipeline across another country. Normally it is impossi-
ble to work in this country between 1st November and 31st March due to climatic 
                                                 
162 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bund.html (10.02.2006). 
163 Comment 1 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
164 Comment 1 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
165 Comment 4 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
166 Comment 4 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
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conditions. The contract is timed to be finished on the 31st October but the start of the 
work was delayed by a month by a civil war in a neighbouring country which makes 
it impossible to bring in all the piping in time. If the consequence is reasonably to 
prevent the completion of the work until recommencement in the following spring 
the party who has to lay the gas line may be entitled to an extension of five months 
even though the delay was itself of one month only.167  
 
For the case that a situation could be considered at the same time as a case of hard-
ship and of force majeure Comment 3 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles refers to 
Comment 6 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. Factual situations are considered which 
can at the same time be considered as cases of hardship and of force majeure under 
the Unidroit Principles in view of the respective definitions of hardship and force 
majeure. If this is the case, the party affected by these events can decide which rem-
edy to pursue.168 If the affected party on one hand calls upon force majeure, it is with 
a view to its non-performance being excused. If, on the other hand, the affected party 
calls upon hardship, this is in the first instance for the purpose of renegotiating the 
terms of the contract so as to allow the contract to be kept alive although on revised 
terms.169
 
Particular reference has to be made to Art. 7.1.7 (4) Unidroit Principles. It reflects 
the aim of force majeure to settle the problems resulting from non-performance, by 
expressly mentioning among the remedies not affected by the occurrence of an im-
pediment preventing a party from performance the right to terminate the contract in 
the case the non-performance is fundamental170; to withhold performance and to re-
quest interest on money due, but not the right to performance171 and where is applies 
the excuse of the non-performing party from liability in damages.172 It makes it 
clearer than does the corresponding provision Art. 79 (5) CISG that as to this latter 
                                                 
167 Comment 2 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
168 Comment 3 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles referring to Comment 6 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Princi-
ples. 
169 Comment 3 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles referring to Comment 6 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Princi-
ples. 
170 Comment  2 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
171 The generic language in Art. 79 (5) CISG may be misunderstood as if the remedy for specific per-
formance were always available in situations covered by Art. 79. C.f. Bonell  on 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html (18.11.2005). 
172 Comment 2 on Art. 7.1.7 Unidroit Principles. 
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remedy the solution has to be found in each single case, in accordance with the crite-
ria laid down for its availability in general.173
 
3.5 Hardship 
Hardship has to be clearly distinguished from force majeure. The difference between 
the two concepts can be described as follows. Hardship is at stake where the per-
formance of the disadvantaged party has become much more burdensome, but not 
impossible, while force majeure means that the performance of the party concerned 
has become impossible, at least temporarily.174 Moreover the two concepts provide a 
functional difference. Hardship constitutes a reason for a change in the contractual 
program of the parties. The aim of the parties remains to implement the contract. 
Force majeure, however, is situated in the context of non-performance, and deals 
with the suspension or termination of the contract.175  
 
Especially for contracts of duration such as contracts for a continuous supply of 
goods or services, long lasting construction contracts or cooperation agreements the 
hardship rule can become of great importance in the event that unforeseen contin-
gencies which may make performance excessively onerous for one party, since the 
rule is more lenient than force majeure.176 Parties to a contract are free to include a 
regulation for the case the performance has become expressly onerous so that the 
economic basis on which the contract was made has lapsed.177 All legal systems have 
to determine when a contracting party should be excused from performance of its 
obligations because of supervening circumstances. Some systems only accept a nar-
row range of excuses; other a more generous.178
 
3.5.1 The hardship approach in the CISG 
There is no rule contained in the CISG that specifically refers to situations, where as 
a result of radically changed circumstances, the performance of one of the parties 
becomes much more onerous and difficult. This problem therefore has to be consid-
                                                 
173 Bonell on http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html (18.11.2005). 
174 Maskow, pg. 663. 
175 Maskow, pg. 664. 
176 Lando, pg. 464. 
177 Lando, pg. 465. 
178 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/ziegel2.html (12.05.2005). 
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ered in the context of Art. 79 CISG. The term “impediment” in Art. 79 CISG does 
not only deal with the case the performance became impossible but also in excep-
tional circumstances in the case the performance became much more burdensome.179 
However, as mentioned before, in general there is no excuse in the case the perform-
ance became more onerous180 as the following case shows. An Italian seller sold 
chrome steel to a Swedish buyer. The seller asked for adjustment or termination of 
the contract for the reason that the market price for chrome steel increased by 30% 
since the conclusion of the contract. The court denied the claim of the seller because 
it was not seen as a case of hardship even though the performance became more on-
erous.181  
 
It has even been suggested that, since the CISG is silent on hardship, the relevant 
provisions contained in the Unidroit Principles could be used to supplement the 
CISG on this point.182 Indeed, if one accepts that Art. 6.2.2 – 6.2.4 Unidroit Princi-
ples are the expression of the basis idea of favor contractus, the link to the CISG 
would be established, since this idea is doubtless also one of the general principles of 
CISG as well. What is less certain, however, is whether the silence of the Convention 
on this point constitutes a true gap to be filled in accordance with Art. 7 (2) CISG or 
whether in Art. 79 the Convention sets out to regulate the grounds for exemption of 
liability in an exhaustive manner so that, to the extent that hardship cannot be con-
sidered to constitute an “impediment” as defined in Art. 79 (1) CISG, it must be de-
nied any relevance under the Convention.183 As the rule in Art. 79 (1) CISG is 
phrased there is a danger that each court will interpret it in accordance with its do-
mestic rules.184 The adjustment of contracts can not be solved through the filling of 
gaps however the solutions provided in the Unidroit Principles and the Principles of 
the European Contract Law are much more appropriate.185 Therefore one might con-
sider Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles as a usage in international trade in terms of Art. 9 
(2) CISG if the conditions thereof are fulfilled.186
 
                                                 
179 Schlechtriem, pg. 187. 
180 General Principle pacta sunt servanda.   
181 www.cisg-online.ch Nr. 540. 
182 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html (15.01.2006). 
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3.5.2 The hardship approach in the Unidroit Principles 
In contrast to the CISG, the Unidroit Principles dedicate an entire section comprising 
of three articles to hardship. The provisions on hardship in the Unidroit Principles 
can be found in Articles 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. From a systematic point of 
view the provisions on hardship are situated in Chapter 6 with the heading “Perform-
ance” which indicates that hardship is related to the fulfilment of the contract. The 
section on hardship starts with Article 6.2.1 stressing that a party for whom perform-
ance becomes more onerous is nevertheless bound to perform his obligations. The 
binding character of the contract as the general rule is similarly mentioned in Article 
1.3 and shows that the Unidroit Principles adopted the juridical principle pacta sunt 
servanda as an indispensable basis of their concern.187 But as Comment 2 on Art. 
6.2.1 Unidroit Principles states, the Principle of sanctity of contract is not however 
considered to be an absolute one. It is accompanied by the counter principle known 
as rebus sic stantibus188 which comes into action when supervening circumstances 
create an exceptional situation so as to destroy the basic assumption which the parties 
had made when they entered into the contract, in other words when a hardship situa-
tion, as defined by Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles, occurs.  
The term hardship itself is defined in Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles basically as a 
situation where the occurrence of events, as specified in Art. 6.2.2 (a) to (d) Unidroit 
Principles, fundamentally alters the equilibrium of the contract, either because the 
cost of a party’s performance has substantially increased or because the value of the 
performance a party receives has substantially diminished. The right to rely on hard-
ship is only possible if the performance is not rendered yet.189 The crucial point is 
clearly the definition of “fundamental” change which will strongly depend upon the 
circumstances of each individual case.190 Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles states that 
fundamental alteration in the balance of the contract may manifest itself in two ways; 
either there is an increase in the cost of the disadvantaged party’s performance or 
decrease in the value of what it has to receive. Usually the party with the non-
monetary contract obligation is confronted with the situation of increase of the costs 
                                                 
187 Unidroit Principles, Article 6.2.1, comment No.1; Doudko, pg. 494. 
188 Contracts might be altered in the event crucial circumstances change which has to be seen as the 
basis of the contract. See http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clausula_rebus_sic_stantibus (09.02.2006). 
189 Comment 4 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
190 Comment 2 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
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in order to perform. Typical examples hereof are situations of increase of the costs 
due to a dramatic rise in the price of the raw materials necessary for the production 
of the goods or the rendering of the services, or to the introduction of new safety 
regulations requiring far more expensive production procedures.191 The substantial 
decrease in value of the performance received by one party includes cases where the 
performance no longer has any value at all for the receiving party. Parties of both, 
monetary and non-monetary obligations can be confronted with the latter situation. 
Reasons for the substantial decrease in the value or the total loss of any value of the 
performance may be due to either drastic changes in market conditions or the frustra-
tion of the purpose for which the performance was required.192 It has to be noted that 
the decrease of value of the performance underlies an objective measurement and 
that a mere change in the personal opinion of the receiving party as to the value of 
the performance is irrelevant.193 In the case of frustration of the purpose of the per-
formance it can only be taken into account when the purpose in question was known 
or at least ought to have been known to both parties.194  
The events have to occur or become known after conclusion of the contract and 
could not reasonably have been taken into account by the disadvantaged party.195 
This means that even if the change in circumstances occurs after the conclusion of 
the contract such circumstances cannot cause hardship if they could reasonably have 
been taken into account by the disadvantaged party at the time the contract was con-
cluded.196An illustration on a case where hardship would be negated is the following: 
A agrees to supply B with crude oil from country X at a fixed price for the next five 
years, notwithstanding the acute political tensions in the region. Two years after the 
conclusion of the contract, a war erupts between contending factions in neighbouring 
countries. The war results in a world energy crisis and oil prices increased drasti-
cally. A is not entitled to invoke hardship because such a rise in the price of crude oil 
was not unforeseeable.197 Further it is compulsory that the event is beyond the con-
                                                 
191 Comment 2 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
192 Comment 2 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
193 Comment 2 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
194 Comment 2 on Art. 6.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
195 Art. 6.2.2 (a), (b) Unidroit Principles. 
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trol of the disadvantaged party and that the risk must not have been assumed by the 
disadvantaged party.198
The effects on hardship are given in Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. The effects have 
both procedural and substantive law aspects.199 The procedural aspect starts with the 
right of the disadvantaged party to request renegotiation of the original terms of the 
contract with a view to adapting them to the changed circumstances. An example of 
that situation is illustrated in Comment 1 on Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. A, a con-
struction company enters into a lump sum contract with B for the erection of a plant 
in country Y. Most of the sophisticated machinery has to be imported from abroad 
but due to an unexpected devaluation of the currency of payment, the cost of the ma-
chinery increases dramatically. A is entitled to request B to renegotiate the original 
contract price so as to adapt it to the changed circumstances.200  
The request for renegotiation must be made without undue delay after the time at 
which hardship is alleged to have occurred. The timeframe in which the request must 
be made depends on the specific circumstances of the case.201  If the disadvantaged 
party fails to comply with these requirements, it does not lose its right to request re-
negotiation. This failure may, however, affect the finding as to whether hardship ac-
tually existed and its consequences for the contract.202 Further the disadvantaged 
party must indicate the grounds for its request for renegotiation in order to give the 
other party the possibility to better assess whether or not the request for renegotiation 
is justified.203  
After the disadvantaged party has asked for renegotiation it must wait for relief and 
the request for renegotiation does not itself entitle the disadvantaged party to with-
hold performance.204 The reason for this lies in the exceptional character of hardship 
and the risk of possible abuses of the remedy.205 However there might exist excep-
tions such as in the following illustration. A and B enter into a contract for the con-
struction of a plant in country X, which adopts new safety regulations after the con-
                                                 
198 Art. 6.2.2 (c), (d) Unidroit Principles. 
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clusion of the contract. The new regulation require additional apparatus and thereby 
fundamentally alter the balance of the contract making A’s performance substantially 
more onerous. A is entitled to request renegotiations and may withhold performance 
in view of the time it needs to implement the new safety regulations, but it may also 
withhold the delivery of the additional apparatus, for a long as the corresponding 
price adaptation is not agreed.206
Both the request for renegotiations by the disadvantaged party and the conduct of 
both parties during the renegotiation process are subject to the general principle of 
good faith in terms of Art. 1.7 Unidroit Principles and to the duty of cooperation in 
terms of Art. 5.1.3 Unidroit Principles.207 As a result the disadvantaged party most 
honestly believe that a case of hardship actually exists and not request renegotiations 
as a purely tactical manoeuvre and once the request has been made, both parties must 
conduct the renegotiations in a constructive manner.208     
If the parties fail to reach agreement on the adaptation of the contract to the changed 
circumstances within a reasonable time, Art. 6.2.3 (3) Unidroit Principles authorizes 
either party to resort to the court. Reasons for the resort to court could be either be-
cause the non-disadvantaged party completely ignored the request for renegotiation 
or because the renegotiations did not achieve a positive outcome although the rene-
gotiations were conducted by both parties in good faith.209 There is no time specified 
for the possibility of the parties before they can resort to court. It must be a reason-
able time and it will depend on the complexity of the issues to be settled and the par-
ticular circumstances of the case.210 It would go beyond the scope of this thesis to 
debate the term “reasonable” in this regard. Art. 6.2.3 (4) Unidroit Principles pro-
vides certain substantive rules for this case which give a legal basis for constructive 
legal decision making.211 According to these rules, a court which finds that a hard-
ship situation exists may react in a number of different ways. One of the possibilities 
given to the court is termination.212 Termination however does not depend on a non-
performance by one of the parties and therefore its effects on the performances al-
                                                 
206 Comment 4 on Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. 
207 Comment 5 on Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. 
208 Comment 5 on Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. 
209 Comment 5 on Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. 
210 Comment 6 on Art. 6.2.3 Unidroit Principles. 
211 Maskow, pg. 663. 
212 Art. 6.2.3 (4) (a) Unidroit Principles. 
38 
3. Comparable view of the CISG and the Unidroit Principles 
ready rendered might be different from those provided for by the rules governing 
termination in general213.214 Further the court has the possibility to adapt the contract 
in order to re-establish the balance of the contract.215 This can be seen as an attempt 
by the court to seek to make a fair distribution of the losses between the parties.216 If 
neither termination nor adaptation is appropriate in certain circumstances, the only 
reasonable solutions are for the court to either direct the parties to resume negotia-
tions or to confirm the terms of the contract as they stand.217  
An illustration hereof is the following situation. A, an exporter, undertakes to supply 
B, an importer, in country X with beer for three years. Two years after the conclusion 
of the contract new legislation is introduced in country X prohibiting the sale and 
consumption of alcoholic drinks. B immediately invokes hardship and requests A to 
renegotiate the contract. A recognises that hardship has occurred, but refuses to ac-
cept the modifications of the contract proposed by B. After one month of inconclu-
sive discussions B decided to resort to court. The court would come to a decision that 
if B has an option to sell the beer in a neighbouring country, although at a significant 
lower price, the court may decide to uphold the contract but to reduce the agreed 
price. But in the case B does not have the foregoing possibility, it may be reasonable 
for the court to terminate the contract, at the same time however obliging B to reim-
burse A for the last delivery still en route.218
 
3.6 Battle of forms 
The "battle of the forms" is the phrase used to describe the exchange of differing 
written proposals which form a contract between two parties.219 Usually companies 
have a standard contract form which is a model they use for the conclusion of con-
tracts. However it happens that both parties to the contract use their general terms 
and conditions for contracts and that their terms and conditions are in conflict due to 
the conflict of interest of the parties.220 For instance, the terms and conditions of the 
seller could exclude or limit his liability for defects in the goods sold, whereas the 
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buyer’s terms and conditions expressly provide that the seller is fully liable for de-
fects.221 The terms and conditions of both parties might not contain unreasonable 
terms and conditions and we therefore a battle of forms situation would arise.222 Two 
questions arise in this connection. First, is there a contract in spite of the conflicting 
terms and conditions and second, if there is, which terms and conditions apply to the 
contract?223 The first question is concerned with the issue whether the acceptance of 
the offer is unqualified and therefore the ‘mirror image rule’224 is maintained. If this 
rule is maintained there is no contract when there is a battle of forms.225
 
The battle of forms plays an important rule in the daily business life. Business people 
and enterprises have their own terms and conditions and of course wish that their 
own standard terms and conditions apply. In order to assure the applicability of their 
own terms and conditions they usually go even further and determine that they will 
only deal if their own terms and conditions prevail.226 Nevertheless, in these and 
most other cases a party does not react to the standard terms and conditions of the 
other party, which it receives.227 The reasons hereof are either it does not discover 
the conflicting terms and conditions or, if he discovers them, he does not wish to take 
up the issue.228 In this case both parties file the two conflicting documents and con-
sider the deal as made. Both parties act as if the mirror image rule did not exist, and 
at that stage none of them think of invoking it. Very often it happens that one party 
discovers on a later stage having made a bad bargain and finds out that the terms and 
conditions are conflicting and claims that he is not bound to the contract due to the 
mirror image rule. An illustration hereof could be in the case e.g. that the price of the 
products sold have risen and the seller might sell them elsewhere to a higher price. 
Further there are situations where after both parties have performed, the incident 
dealt with in the conflicting terms and conditions comes up. An illustration hereof 
would be the situation that the goods delivered are defective, and the buyer claims 
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damage. The seller then invokes the mirror image rule and maintains that there was 
no contract.229  
 
The Unidroit Principles deal with the battle of forms issue in Art. 2.1.22.230 The gen-
eral rules on offer and acceptance do not apply in this case. If they would apply there 
would be either no contract at all since the purported acceptance by the offeree 
would in general amount to a counter-offer, or if the two parties have started to per-
form without objecting to each other’s standard terms, a contract would be consid-
ered to have been concluded on the basis of those terms which were the last to be 
sent or to be referred to.231 In order to counteract the possibility for one party to use 
the conflicting terms and condition to get out a bargain Art. 2.1.22 Unidroit Princi-
ples provide that the mirror image rule does not apply for the reason that the parties 
did not wish it to apply when they made the contract.232  
 
When forming the CISG no specific provision for the battle of forms situation was 
determined.233 Despite a few approaches were taken no specific regulation was im-
plemented into the Convention.234 Therefore Art. 19 CISG will be mostly applicable 
in the event of collusion of the terms and conditions of the parties.235 Under the Con-
vention, a varied acceptance in which the variance is material236 will not conclude a 
contract. This was intended to encourage parties to negotiate and mutually agree on 
all of the material terms of a contract prior to beginning performance.237 The only 
time an acceptance will conclude a contract when the acceptance varies from the 
terms of the offer is when it contains additional or different terms "which do not ma-
terially alter the terms of the offer" and the offeror does not promptly object to the 
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alteration. Therefore, even if the additional or different terms do not alter the offer 
materially, if the offeror objects to those terms, no contract will be formed.238
 
However some commentators interpret the provisions of the CISG to that effect that 
a contract is concluded. This approach is invoked by the Artt. 18 (1) and (3), 16 (2), 
8 (1) and (2), 9 (1) and 29 (2)239 and this view is also supported by a Dutch240 and a 
German241 case. Other commentators will only admit that there is a contract, when 
both parties have performed before the issue is raised.242
 
The second issue regarding the questions which terms and conditions prevail has to 
be dealt with very carefully. In the case the buyer for example discovers that the 
goods sold have defects, the buyer may claim termination of the contract and dam-
ages to which he is entitled under his own terms and conditions. Then the seller 
might invoke his terms and conditions to maintain that the buyer has no claim. One 
or even both of them may show that his terms and conditions provide that they shall 
always prevail over the other party’s conflicting terms and conditions. In this case 
three solutions have to be regarded. The three solutions could be the “first shot rule”, 
“the last shot rule” and “the knock each other out rule”.243
 
The “first shot rule” maintains when the terms and conditions of the offeree differ 
from those of the offeror, the offeror’s terms and conditions prevail. An argument for 
this solution is that an offeree who accepts an offer must take it as it is. He should not 
be permitted to change the terms and conditions.244 However it must be taken into 
consideration when supporting that rule that with this solution it is often a coinci-
dence who made the first offer and that it therefore leads to an arbitrary result.245
 
The “last shot rule” prevails when the last shot was the offere’s communication of 
acceptance and his terms are applicable. That is the solution which is seen by many 
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commentators as the one which is most in harmony with the CISG provisions Art. 19 
and 18 (1).246 The main argument therefore is that the one who receives the last shot 
must be bound by his silence. In a German case247 the OLG248 followed the last shot 
rule. A German company ordered two hundred tons of bacon from an Italian com-
pany. In the offer of the German company it was determined that the bacon shall be 
delivered wrapped in foil. The declaration of acceptance of the offer however deter-
mined that the bacon shall be delivered unwrapped. The German buyer did not take 
up the issue again and accepted the first four part-deliveries; however refused to ac-
cept afterwards the outstanding delivery. The court held that the divergence of offer 
and acceptance has to be seen as essential and that the declaration of acceptance of 
the offer of the Italian company has to be regarded as a counter offer, which was ac-
cepted by the German company. There are however commentators with the contrary 
opinion and maintaining the view that you cannot rely on Artt. 18 (1) and 19 CISG 
since the delegates refused to deal with the “battle of forms” problem, when it was 
raised at the Diplomatic Conference in 1980.249 Same as the “first shot rule” it is a 
coincidence who fired the last shot.250
 
Under the third solution the conflicting terms and conditions knock each other out. 
The contract exists of those terms and conditions which are common in substance.251 
The gaps which arise due to the invalidity of the terms and conditions which have 
knocked each other out have to be filled by the courts or arbitrators.252 This solution 
is adopted by Art. 2.1.22 Unidroit Principles.253 Comment 3 on Art. 2.1.22 Unidroit 
Principles only regard the “last shot rule” as appropriate if the parties clearly indicate 
that the adoption of their standard terms and conditions are an essential condition for 
the conclusion of the contract. If however the parties refer to their standard terms and 
conditions more or less automatically they will normally not even be aware of the 
conflict between their respective standard terms and conditions. In such a situation it 
is seen as unreasonable to allow the parties then to question the very existence of the 
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contract or to insist on the application of the terms last sent or referred to.254 Despite 
the general rules of offer and acceptance the provisions in the Unidroit Principles 
provide that if the parties reach agreement except on their standard terms and condi-
tions, a contract is concluded on the basis of the agreed terms and conditions and of 
any standard terms and conditions which are common in substance.255 In the case A 
orders a machine from B indicating on his order form with its “General Conditions 
for Purchase” the type of machine, the price, the terms of payment, and the date and 
place of delivery. B accepts by sending an acknowledgement of order form with its 
own “General Conditions for Sale”. Afterwards A seeks to withdraw from the con-
tract arguing that no contract was concluded since the parties did not reach an 
agreement as to which set of standard terms should apply. However the parties have 
agreed on the essential terms of the contract, a contract has been concluded on those 
terms and on all standard terms which are common in substance.256
 
Even in some cases under the CISG the “knock out doctrine” found application. In 
the following CISG case the Dutch claimant ordered powdered milk from the defen-
dant, a German company. The claimant resold the powdered milk to an Algerian 
company which determined that some of the powdered milk had a rancid taste. As a 
consequence the Algerian customer of the buyer complained to the buyer about the 
quality of the powdered milk. The Dutch buyer compensated the Algerian company 
and itself claimed damage from the German company. The defendant refused to pay 
and referred to their terms and conditions for delivery which stated the limitation of 
liability. The claimant referred to their terms and conditions regarding warranty of 
alternative terms of delivery. The LG257 dismissed the complaint. On appeal by the 
buyers, the OLG granted the buyer’s claim after obtaining an expert opinion on the 
cause of the defect and dismissed the appeal as to the rest. On appeal to the BGH258 
the seller requested the dismissal of the case in its entirety. The BGH held that the 
buyer’s standard terms and conditions are in contradiction with the seller’s standard 
terms and conditions and that no party wanted to accept the terms and conditions of 
the other party. Therefore the rules have to be regarded as invalid in terms of the the-
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ory of legal validity and the court has to fill the gaps left by the terms and conditions 
which have knocked each other out. Thus the court rejected the application of the last 
shot rule.259  
 
The basis of this solution has to be seen in the priority of the party autonomy which 
allows the parties to diverge from Artt. 19 (1) and (3) CISG, despite the fact that the 
parties did not find consent on the standard terms and conditions applicable to the 
contract. This is especially true in the case the parties were negotiating over a long 
period of time and the parties often pointed out their own terms and conditions to the 
other party but it is clear from their negotiations that the conclusion of the contract is 
important to them also when they have to diverge from their own terms and condi-
tions. Especially if the parties fulfil the contract it can very clearly be seen that the 
divergence of the terms and conditions should not lead to the cancellation of the con-
tract.260 As seen from the aforementioned in most cases the parties intended a con-
tract to be concluded in spite of the conflicting terms and conditions and did not raise 
the issue. In these cases there is no reason to let one party’s terms and conditions 
prevail261 which clearly speaks in favour of the “knock out rule” provided by the 
Unidroit Principles. As seen from the above mentioned case the CISG regulates the 
issue and therefore there exists no given reason to fall back to national law262 but the 
application of the “knock out rule”, which is favoured by the author, remains possi-
ble. However the opinion seems that the most –followed, although in Germany the 
BGH considers the “knock out rule” as to be the prevailing one, leads to the applica-
tion of what has been referred to as the “last shot rule”.263
 
For those times when parties choose to carry out an international sales transaction 
without fully negotiating an agreement, relying instead on an exchange of forms, the 
parties may have a problem under the CISG. If those parties later have a need to de-
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termine the particular terms of the contract, the Convention will not provide a clear 
answer to the conclusion of the contract and to the prevailing terms and conditions. 
However the provisions in the Unidroit Principles provide good and modern solu-
tions to these issues and hence are more favourable in the opinion of the author. 
 
3.7 Specific performance 
In general contracts provide that one party shall make performance and that the other 
party shall pay a sum of money for the performance. If one of the parties does not 
perform the contractual obligation the question arises whether or not the other party 
is entitled to enforce the performance. One has to distinguish between monetary and 
non-monetary obligations. 
In the case of monetary obligations, in continental law systems a party may require 
performance of the contractual obligation to pay money.264 In some of the common 
law systems an action for an agreed sum of money is available.265 However common 
law systems limit the action in certain respects and may be brought only when the 
price has been earned by performance.266 There are situations where the buyer does 
not want the other party to perform anymore. The main rule is that the buyer must 
receive the performance and pay the price however there are exceptions as the prede-
cessor of the CISG for example shows. The Uniform Law on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods of 1964267 provides in Art. 61 (2) ULIS that a seller shall not 
be entitled to require payment of the price by the buyer if it is in conformity with 
usage and reasonably possible for the seller to resell the goods. In that case the con-
tract shall be regarded as ended, and the seller may only claim damages.268 The 
CISG however includes no such rule on restriction on the seller’s right to perform 
and claim the price hereof. Also no such rule can be found in the Unidroit Principles. 
The latter one in Art. 7.2.1 states that: Where a party who is obliged to pay money 
does not do so, the other party may require payment. This article reflects the gener-
ally accepted principle that payment of money which is due under a contractual obli-
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gation can always be demanded and, if the demand is not met, enforced by legal ac-
tion before a court.269
In the case of non-monetary obligations the common law countries recognize specific 
performance as a remedy. However specific performance is subsidiary to the damage 
remedy and will only be granted where damages are inadequate and it is in the 
court’s discretion to make their decision in line with the applicable rules.270 In civil 
law jurisdictions specific performance is recognized as a prior remedy except where 
the performance has become impossible or illegal. In this event it would be unrea-
sonable to grant specific performance, for instance in the case the costs to make per-
formance possible would be higher than the value of the goods sold; a further excep-
tion exists in a few civil jurisdictions.271  
Art. 28 CISG considers the extent to which a national court is required to enter a 
judgment for specific performance of an obligation arising under this Convention. If 
the seller does not perform one of his obligations under the contract of sale or this 
Convention, Art. 46 provides that the buyer may require performance by the seller. 
Similarly, Art. 62 authorizes the seller to require the buyer to pay the price, take de-
livery or perform his other obligations. The question arises whether the injured party 
can obtain the aid of a court to enforce the obligation of the party in default to per-
form the contract. As mentioned above, in some legal systems the courts are author-
ized to order specific performance of an obligation and in other legal systems courts 
are not authorized to order certain forms of specific performance and those states 
could not be expected to alter fundamental principles of their judicial procedure in 
order to bring the CISG into force.272 Art. 28 CISG provides that a court is not bound 
to enter a judgment providing for specific performance unless the court could do so 
under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Conven-
tion, e.g., domestic contracts of sale. Thus resulting a court has the authority under 
any circumstances to order a particular form of specific performance, e.g. to deliver 
the goods or to pay the price, Art. 28 does not limit the application of Artt. 46 or 62 
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CISG. Art. 28 CISG limits their application only if a court could not under any cir-
cumstances order such a form of specific performance.273  
Art.7.2.2 Unidroit Principles states that: 
‘Where a party who owes an obligation other than one to pay money does not per-
form, the other party may require performance, unless  
(a) performance is impossible in law or in fact; 
(b) performance or, where relevant, enforcement is unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive; 
(c) the party entitled to performance may reasonably obtain performance from 
another source; 
(d) performance is of an exclusively personal character; or 
(e) the party entitled to performance does not require performance within a rea-
sonable time after it has, or ought to have, become aware of the non-
performance.’ 
Following the basic approach of Art. 46 CISG the Unidroit Principles adopt the prin-
ciple of specific performance, subject to certain qualifications.274 In particular this 
principle is regarded as highly important with respect to contracts other than sales 
contracts.275 While Art. 28 CISG provides that ‘a court is not bound to enter a judg-
ment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in re-
spect of similar contracts of sale not governed by [the] Convention’, under the 
Unidroit Principles specific performance is not a discretionary remedy, i.e. a court 
must order performance, unless one of the exceptions laid down in Art. 7.2.2 
Unidroit Principles applies.276
In terms of Art. 7.2.2 (a) Unidroit Principles a performance which is impossible in 
law or fact, cannot be required. However impossibility does not nullify a contract 
instead other remedies may be available to the aggrieved party.277 For example, the 
refusal of a public permission which is required under the applicable domestic law 
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and which affects the validity of the contract renders the contract void, with the con-
sequence that the problem of enforceability of the performance cannot arise. When, 
however, the refusal merely renders the performance impossible without affecting 
the validity of the contract, Art. 7.2.2 (a) Unidroit Principles applies and performance 
cannot be required.278 Art. 7.2.2 (a) Unidroit Principles also provides regulations for 
the case the performance has become illegal however in these cases the debtor may 
also be held liable for damages. The CISG has no such rule and the court will have to 
order specific performance, also when it has become unreasonably burdensome or 
expensive.279
The Comment on Art. 7.2.2 (b) Unidroit Principles explains the situation of unrea-
sonably burdensome or expensive. If the situation arises where the performance, al-
though still possible, may have become so onerous due to a drastic change of circum-
stances after the conclusion of the contract, it would run counter to the general prin-
ciple of good faith and fair dealing in terms of Art. 1.7 Unidroit Principles to require 
it.280 An illustration hereof is given in Comment 3 on Art. 7.2.2 Unidroit Principles. 
In a heavy storm an oil tanker has sunk in costal waters. In this case the shipper may 
not require performance of the contract of carriage, even if it would be still possible 
to lift the ship from the bottom of the sea, if this would involve the shipowner in ex-
pense vastly exceeding the value of the oil. 
The entitlement of one party in terms of Art. 7.2.2 (c) Unidroit Principles is based on 
the idea that many goods and services are of a standard kind, i.e. the same goods or 
services are offered by many suppliers.281 In the case of contract involving such sta-
ple goods or standard services, and the other party is not performing, most customers 
will not wish to waste time and effort extracting the contractual performance from 
the other party. In general business life is very fast moving and they cannot even 
afford to wait unreasonably long. Instead, they will go into the market, obtain substi-
tute goods or services and claim damages for non-performance.282 The word "rea-
sonably" specifies that the simple fact that the same performance can be obtained 
from another source is not in itself sufficient, since the aggrieved party could not in 
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certain situations reasonably be expected to have the option to an alternative sup-
plier.283 An illustration hereof would be the situation where A, situated in a develop-
ing country where foreign exchange is scarce, buys a machine of a standard type 
from B in Tokyo. In accordance with the contract, A pays the sales price before de-
livery however B does not deliver. Although A has the possibility to obtain the ma-
chine from another source in Japan, it would be regarded as unreasonably in view of 
the scarcity and high price of foreign exchange in its home country to require A to 
take this route. Resulting that, A is entitled to require delivery of the machine from 
B.284
In the comment on Art. 7.2.2 (d) Unidroit Principles it is explained by the considera-
tion that the exception in the case the performance is of an exclusively personal char-
acter would be a severe interference with a party’s personal freedom. Further, such 
performance rendered under force would often be unsatisfactory because the per-
formance would impair its quality, and finally it would be difficult for a court to con-
trol the proper enforcement of the order.285 In particular regard has to be rendered to 
the phrase “exclusively personal character”. Comment 3 (d) on Art. 7.2.2 Unidroit 
Principles determines that a performance is of exclusively personal character if it is 
not delegable and requires individual skills of an artistic or scientific nature or if it 
involves a confidential and personal relationship. The exceptional circumstances do 
not include obligations undertaken by a company, ordinary activities of a lawyer, 
surgeon or engineer. An illustration hereof would be an undertaking by a firm of ar-
chitects to design a row of 10 private homes can be specifically enforced as the firm 
can delegate the task to one of the partners or employ an outside architect to perform 
it. However, if it would be an undertaking by a world famous architect to design a 
new city hall, embodying the idea of a city of the 21st century, cannot be enforced 
because it is highly unique and calls for the exercise of very special skills.286
The exception in Art. 7.2.2. (e) Unidroit Principles is explained in its comment 3 and 
is based on the consideration that performance of a contract often requires special 
preparation and efforts by the obligor. If the time for performance has passed but the 
obligee has failed to demand performance within a reasonable time, the obligor may 
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be entitled to assume that the obligee will not insist upon performance. If the obligee 
were to be allowed to leave the obligor in a state of uncertainty as to whether per-
formance will be required, the risk might arise of the obligee's speculating unfairly, 
to the detriment of the obligor, upon a favourable development of the market.287 In 
order to counteract the uncertainty Art. 7.2.2 (e) Unidroit Principles was developed 
to exclude the right to performance if it is not required within a reasonable time after 
the obligee has become or should have become aware of the non-performance. What 
can be seen as “reasonable time” must be determined in each single case and to go 
further into the term reasonable in this context would go beyond the scope of the 
thesis. 
 
3.8 Good faith 
Art. 1.7 Unidroit Principles states that ‘Each party must act in accordance with good 
faith and fair dealing in international trade and that the parties may not exclude or 
limit this duty.’ Throughout the Unidroit Principles there are a number of provisions 
constituting a direct or indirect application of this principle which means that good 
faith and fair dealing may be considered to be one of the fundamental ideas underly-
ing the Unidroit Principles.288 This article makes it clear that even in the absence of 
special provisions in the Unidroit Principles the parties’ behaviour throughout the life 
of the contract, including the negotiating process, must conform to good faith and 
fair dealing.289 Examples are illustrated in the comments on Art. 1.7 Unidroit Princi-
ples. 
 
Comment 2 on Art. 1.7 Unidroit Principles illustrates examples which would be typi-
cal behaviour contrary good faith and fair dealing and refers to the term used in some 
legal systems as “abuse of rights”. Examples for the malicious behaviour are cases 
where a party exercises a right merely to damage the other party, for another purpose 
for which it had been granted or when the exercise of a right is disproportionate to 
the original intention. One of the two examples given in Comment 2 on Art. 1.7 
Unidroit Principles is a case of disproportionableness. One party rents premises from 
the other party to open a restaurant. The operator of the restaurant sets up tables out 
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of doors during the summer month. The noise outdoor is increased due to the tables 
outside and it is difficult to find renters for the apartments in the same building. In 
this case it would be an abuse of rights if the operator of the restaurant would be told 
that he may not serve outdoor at all instead of requesting to not serve outside during 
late evening times. 
 
The reference to good faith and fair dealing in international trade in the Unidroit 
Principles make it clear that in the context of the Unidroit Principles the two con-
cepts are not to be applied in accordance to the standards ordinarily adopted within 
the different domestic law systems.290 However these domestic standards might be 
taken in consideration to the extent that they are shown to be generally accepted 
among various legal systems.291 The reference to good faith and fair dealing should 
always be understood as a reference to good faith and fair dealing in international 
trade and must be also construed in the light that standards of business practice may 
vary considerably from one trade sector to another, or even between one trade sector 
depending on various factors such as technical skills.292
 
The principle on good faith and fair dealing is of mandatory character and the parties 
may not exclude or limit the provision. The parties must act strictly in accordance 
with it, however it is in the parties’ discretion to provide in their contract a duty to 
observe more stringent standards of behaviour.293
 
The CISG has no such rule. However Art. 7 (1) CISG provides that in the interpreta-
tion of the CISG regard it to be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade. Various commentators have outlined four possible approaches to the 
role and scope of good faith within the CISG: (i) that the good faith provision in Art. 
7 (1) CISG should be used only in interpreting the Convention, (ii) that the conduct 
of contracting parties is governed by a positive obligation of good faith provided in 
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Art. 7 (1) CISG, (iii) that good faith is a general principle of the CISG and (iv) that 
good faith is a general principle of the lex mercatoria and Unidroit.294  
 
Good faith in the Unidroit Principles occupies a very important place throughout the 
life of the contractual relationship, whereas it is only referred to in the CISG in con-
nection with the interpretation of the contract.295 Same as the Unidroit Principles the 
CISG has to be interpreted autonomously and it shall be avoided to apply it in accor-
dance with a specific domestic law.296 This is in order to counteract the “homeward 
trend" in interpretation that is the risk that judges from different cultural and legal 
backgrounds are apt to rely upon individual national legal heritages.297 Further it has 
to be pointed out that single terms of the Convention have to be interpreted autono-
mously and that there shall be no interpretation in the light of a specific domestic 
law.298 However this approach is criticised by Lando. He states that:  
“Should a court only apply the principle of good faith if it has assurance that certain 
behaviour is covered by ‘internationally recognized principles of honourable conduct 
and, as far as possible, with the maximum measure of agreement between the courts 
of contracting states’. If a court can apply the principle only when it has ascertained 
that there is such maximum measure of agreement there is a risk that courts will not 
dare to apply the good faith principle when it finds that it should cover a certain con-
duct in international trade, and this regardless of whether or not other legal systems 
have endorsed the solution.” 
 
A further medium to promote uniformity in the interpretation of the CISG is the ref-
erence to follow the foreign decisions,299 literature and comments on the CISG and 
make use of the available database such as CISG-online.300 In the case a factual issue 
is decided by a supreme court of one of the member states it shall be regarded as 
”persuasive authority” even if another interpretation is considerable.301 Partly an 
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international standard of good faith may already exist and may clearly be revealed 
and defined, at least in business branches with a long-standing tradition. Partly that 
standard may not exist but remains to be developed by business circles, arbitrators 
and courts, for instance in fresh modern trade branches like e.g. telesales.302  
 
Art. 7 (1) CISG only determines the interpretation of the CISG and makes no refer-
ence to the behaviour of the contract parties by the conclusion or the fulfilling of the 
contract and the interpretation of the declarations of the parties. The inclusion in the 
Convention of a provision creating an obligation of good faith was the occasion for 
extensive and at times obscure disputes not only between socialist and capitalistic 
representatives, but also between common law and civil law delegates and even 
among representatives who shared a common cultural and legal background.303 
Opinions on the role to be played by good faith ranged from the idea that it should be 
viewed as an obligation present at all stages of the contracting process to the view 
that good faith should not be explicitly mentioned in any provision.304 In view of 
these sharply divided opinions, a compromise was finally reached in article 7(1) pro-
viding that the Convention must be interpreted taking into account the observance of 
good faith in international trade. Although the only express reference to the good 
faith principles can be solely found in Art. 7 (1) CISG which relates to the CISG’s 
interpretation, there are numerous applications of that principle throughout the 
CSIG.305 Indications hereof can be found in Artt. 16 (2) (b), 21 (2), 29 (2), 37, 40, 47 
(2), 64 (2) and 85 to 88 CISG.306 Although contractual obligations can not be implied 
by good faith in a contract governed by the CISG, in contrast to the position in the 
Unidroit Principles, it is argued that nevertheless, it is widely accepted that also un-
der the CISG additional obligations can be implied such as a general duty to cooper-
ate.307 This rule can be understood as an expression of the general principle, which is 
based on good faith, that neither party must hinder performance through the other nor 
otherwise militate against the contractual purpose.308 It should be noted that the doc-
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trine of good faith is broader in its scope, but these examples do give an indication of 
the type of obligation a duty of good faith requires.309  
 
Common is a sense that parties to a contract for the international sale of goods are 
required to do all that is reasonable, and prohibited from doing all that is not reason-
able, to ensure the contract remains on foot.310 This is consistent with the principle of 
contract continuance embodied within the CISG.311 Further it is noted that it is not 
possible in practice to distinguish a problem of interpretation from one of supple-
mentation.312 It is not seen as reasonable that a question of interpretation of a rule in 
the CISG is, and the interpretation of a term in the sales contract is not to be gov-
erned by the principle of good faith. It is requested that the principle must also gov-
ern the parties’ behaviour.313 There are cases were the courts applying CISG have in 
fact applied the principle of good faith to the interpretation of the contract314 and the 
parties’ behaviour315.316  
 
Despite these obvious differences of wording both texts accord in their essence. 
Therefore, it is common ground that under the CISG the good faith principle also 
applies to the interpretation of the individual contract and to the parties’ contractual 
relationship as such.317 Both the CISG and the Unidroit Principles acknowledge that 
good faith plays an important role in international contracts. Furthermore, both texts 
do not exclusively rely on one abstract and general rule of good faith but try to spec-
ify the concept by more specific rules which elaborate the principle in some detail.318 
In a number of situations the Unidroit Principles prove to be helpful assistance for 
the good faith interpretation in the CISG.319 Combining the CISG and the Unidroit 
Principles one gets a good impression what good faith in international commercial 
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relations should and could mean.320 However the practice shows that there is an in-
consistent application and interpretation of the good faith provision in the CISG. This 
causes a great insecurity and a party when entering into a sales contract does not 
know how a conflict will be handled in the case it arises and what consequences it 
may have.  
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4. Art. 7 CISG, the link between the CISG and the          
Unidroit Principles 
The CISG will better fulfil its purpose if it is interpreted in a consistent manner in all 
legal systems. Great care was taken in its preparation to make it as clear and easy to 
understand as possible. Nevertheless, disputes will arise as to its meaning and appli-
cation. When this occurs, all parties, including domestic courts and arbitral tribunals, 
are required to observe its international character and to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade in particular when 
a question concerning Art. 7 (2) CISG arises.321 Art. 7 (2) CISG states that questions 
concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it 
are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in 
the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law. The CISG has a twofold requirement for filling of 
gaps. First, the issue must not be expressly settled in the CISG and, second, the gaps 
must be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the Convention is 
based.322 It is made clear that the gaps, if possible, are to be filled without resorting 
to domestic law, but rather in conformity to the Convention’s general principles.323 It 
shall only be resorted to domestic law where no such general principles can be iden-
tified.324   
 
The CISG does not deal with all the issues that arise from international sales con-
tracts.325 For instance, Art. 4 CISG states that the CISG governs only the formation 
of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer and 
expressly states that it is not concerned with either the validity of the contract, any of 
its provisions, any usage or the effect the contract may have on the property in the 
goods sold. Art. 4 CISG is not the only evidence that the CISG is not an exhaustive 
body of rules. In line with Art. 5 CISG, the CISG does not apply to the liability of the 
seller for death or personal injury caused by the goods. The mentioned issues as well 
as other issued which are excluded from the sphere of application of the CISG are 
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termed as “external gaps”326. Art. 7 (2) CISG and gap filling is directly connected to 
Art. 7 (1) CISG and interpretation because of their substantive relationship with each 
other.327 Gaps in law constitute a danger to the uniformity and autonomy of the 
CISG’s interpretation, for the reason that “one way to follow the homeward trend is 
to find gaps in the law.”328 In accordance with the basic criteria established in Art. 7 
(1) CISG uniformity in the CISG’s application is the ultimate goal. 
 
The “external gaps” must be distinguished from matters governed by the CISG but 
which are not expressly settled in it. These gaps are termed as “internal gaps”329. 
This distinction is compulsory since different types of gaps are dealt with differ-
ently.330 The “external gaps” are to be filled by resorting to the “law applicable by 
virtue of the rules of private international law”331 and the “internal gaps” are to be 
“settled in conformity with the general principles on which the Convention is 
based”332. Resorting to the rules of private international law would not only represent 
regression into the uncertainty of choice of law rules and the escalation of trans-
national cost for litigants, it would also endanger the CISG’s success by undermining 
the uniformity of its application.333 It is evident that courts or tribunals, when inter-
preting the CISG, should to the largest extent possible refrain from resorting to do-
mestic laws and try to find a solution within the CISG itself.334 In the CISG only 
little guidance in order to distinguish between the aforementioned types of gaps is 
given. That is the reason why there is no unanimous opinion if in the case the “inter-
nal gaps” can not be settled in conformity with the general principles on which the 
CISG Convention is based the recourse to the law applicable by virtue of the rules of 
private international law should be possible.335 Burden of proof is one example 
where the commentators do not agree on whether of not the issue is governed by the 
CISG.336
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Before the gap filling rule, in terms of Art. 7 (2) CISG, can be put into operation; the 
matters to which the rule applies must first be identified. In general there exist three 
different approaches to fill internal gaps. The first approach is known as the “true 
code approach” where the code is approached as a source of law itself and attention 
is only given to the code itself, including the purposes of the code and the policies 
underlying the code.337 The second approach relies on the use of external legal prin-
ciples to fill gaps found in the code and is known as the “meta-code approach”.338 
The latter approach is based on the idea that external legal principles should supple-
ment the provisions of a code unless this expressly disallowed by that code.339 The 
third approach is a combination of the two foregoing approaches to gap filling. Ac-
cording to this approach one is supposed to first apply the general principles of the 
code and in the absence of any such principles one should resort to the rules of pri-
vate international law.340 The CISG is an approach that combines recourse to general 
principles with an eventual recourse to the rules of private international law.341 In the 
event a matter is governed by the CISG but not expressly settled in it, Art. 7 (2) 
CISG offers a solution by (i) internal analogy, where the CISG’s other provisions 
contain an applicable general principle; or (ii) reference to external legal principles, 
the rules of private international law, when the CISG does not contain an applicable 
general principle.342 There exist two complementary methods of gap filling. First, an 
analogical application of specific provisions of the CISG and second, a consideration 
of the general principles underlying the CISG as a whole, when the gap cannot be 
filled by analogical application of specific provisions.343  
 
Bonell explains the difference between the two gap filling methods as follows. ‘Re-
course to general principles as a means of gap filling differs from reasoning by anal-
ogy insofar as it constitutes an attempt to find a solution for the case at hand not by 
mere extension of specific provisions dealing with analogous cases, but on the basis 
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of principles and rules which because of their general character may be applied on a 
much wider scale.’344
 
Gap filling by analogy is concerned with the application of certain rules or solutions 
taken from specific CISG provisions to be applied in analogous cases in order to re-
solve legislative gaps. One of the elements necessary for gap filling by analogy is the 
discovery of a specific provision dealing with similar issues to the ones present in the 
gap.345 The provisions in the CISG have to be examined to the effect that the analo-
gous provision may be restricted to its particular content and the extension to other 
situations would be arbitrary and contrary to the intention of the drafters or the pur-
pose of the rule itself.346 If there is no reason for the limitation of the analogical ap-
plication of a specific rule to another CISG provision the gap should be filled by an 
application of that rule by analogy. There is no uniform opinion on the test to be ap-
plied finding out whether or not a gap can be filled by analogy.347  
 
When the solution to a gap filling problem cannot be achieved by analogical applica-
tion of a rule found in a specific CISG provision, the filling of gap can be performed 
by the application of the general principles on which the CISG is based.348 In this 
situation the case in question does not get solved solely by extending specific provi-
sions dealing with analogous cases but on the basis of rules which may apply on a 
much wider scale for the reason of their general character.349 Further a distinction 
has to be drawn between those principles extrapolated from within specific CISG 
provisions and the general principles of comparative law on which the CISG as a 
whole is founded.350 Some principles on which the CISG is based are expressly iden-
tified such as the principle of good faith and the one which is regarded as the most 
important principle, the principle of party autonomy.351 The CISG provides that ex-
press contractual provisions take precedence over the default provisions of the CISG. 
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Thus, contracting parties remain free to specify whatever law or terms they wish to 
apply to their transaction, and may exclude altogether the application of the CISG to 
their contractual relationship. Further general principles, upon which the CISG Con-
vention is based, either expressly identified or not. Examples hereof are e.g. estop-
pel352 and the principle of full compensation353.  
 
In general it has been the courts and arbitrators task to determine in each case those 
general principles. Further they have to fulfil the task to derive from those general 
principles the solutions for the specific question to be settled. The Unidroit Principles 
could facilitate to derive a solution from those specific questions on the condition 
that it can be shown that the relevant provisions of the Unidroit Principles are the 
expression of a general principle underlying the CISG.354  
 
According to Art. 7 (1) CISG in the interpretation of this Convention regard is to be 
had to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its applica-
tion. As mentioned above the courts and arbitrators have to find the principles and 
criteria for the proper interpretation of the CISG each time themselves. In order to 
assure the uniformity in interpreting the CISG and pay regard to its international 
character the Unidroit Principles could considerably facilitate their task in this re-
spect.355
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5. The Unidroit Principles as a means to interpret and 
supplement the CISG 
As mentioned in the forgoing chapter the link between the CISG and the Unidroit 
Principles is established on Art. 7 CISG. There are two ways to bring in the Unidroit 
Principles under a case of the CISG. First: as an interpretation aid in terms of Art. 7 
(1) CISG and second: in deriving the solutions of the Unidroit Principles regarding 
general principles on which the CISG is based in terms of Art. 7 (2) CISG. However 
the opinion among legal scholars is divided. There are those who categorically deny 
that the Unidroit Principles can be used to interpret or supplement the CISG, invok-
ing the formalistic argument that the Unidroit Principles were adopted later in time 
than the CISG and therefore cannot be of any relevance to the latter.356 A favourable 
view of the possible use of the Unidroit Principles in interpreting and supplementing 
the CISG is taken by various commentators such as Cazon357, Magnus358, Viscasil-
las359. 
 
Both the CISG and the Unidroit Principles are concerned with international commer-
cial contracts. The reason for the recourse to the Unidroit Principles is that the CISG 
contains important ambiguities and gaps as it is becoming increasingly clear.360 
There is a high practical impact of the gaps. Louis and Patrick Del Duca found that 
of the 142 reported cases decided up to January 1, 1996, 52 disputes involved issues 
of law not addressed in the CISG. 42 involved questions of interest rates where the 
buyer was late in making payment or the seller was late in making refund.361  
 
The Unidroit Principles, while building on the CISG’s very solid foundation, have 
remedied many of its unavoidable shortcomings but also include restatements that 
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include provisions derived from the CISG.362 As demonstrated in chapter three, the 
Unidroit Principles are much more comprehensive in scope,363 often more detailed in 
addressing the same issues and they may fill many of the gaps in the CISG provi-
sions.364 The reasons hereof will be discussed in the final chapter of the thesis. To 
the extent that the two provisions address the same issues, the rules laid down in the 
Unidroit Principles are normally taken either literally or at least in substance from the 
corresponding provisions of the CISG. Only in exceptional cases the Unidroit Princi-
ples depart from the CISG provisions. 
 
The most significant departure of the Unidroit Principles from the CISG is most 
likely the provision for good faith which was already discussed in chapter three. The 
Unidroit Principles impose upon the parties a duty to act in good faith throughout the 
life of the contract, including the negotiation process, while the CISG, in contrast, 
expressly refers to good faith only in the context and for the purpose of the interpre-
tation of the Convention as such. However as outlined in chapter three the scope of 
the principle of good faith in the CISG is not limited to the interpretation of the Con-
vention but also finds numerous other applications. 
 
Another departure is the provision according to which usages do not bind the parties 
whenever their application would be unreasonable.365 These conflicting provisions 
were not outlined in chapter three. The reason for this limitation in the Unidroit Prin-
ciples is, as states in the comment, that the application of a particular usage, though 
regularly observed by the generality of business people in a particular trade sector, 
may nevertheless be unreasonable in a given case. Then again the CISG expressly 
excludes this observation from the scope of the Convention. Reasons therefore is the 
observation that in order to protect parties from developing countries against usages 
unknown to them because they were developed in industrialized countries, Art. 9 (2) 
CISG requires that the parties ‘knew or ought to have known’ the usage. The 
                                                 
362 Felemegas, pg. 289. 
363 New Provisions were included on the manner in which a contract may be concluded, on writings in 
confirmation, on the case where the parties make the conclusion of their contract dependent upon 
reaching an agreement on specific matters or in a specific form, on contracts with the terms deliber-
ately left open, on negotiations in bad faith, on the duty of confidentiality, on merger clauses, on con-
tracting on the basis of standard terms, on surprising provisions in standard terms, on the conflict 
between standard terms and individually negotiated terms and on the battle of forms. 
364 Perillo on http://soi.cnr.it/~crdcs/crdcs/perillo.htm (10.02.2006)/ 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/carlsen.html (11.02.2006). 
365 Art. 1.8 (2) Unidroit Principles and Art. 4, 9(2) CISG. 
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5. The Unidroit Principles as a means to interpret and supplement the CISG 
Unidroit Principles seek to accommodate the parties’ interest more directly by pro-
tecting the parties against the application of unreasonable usages.366 The provisions 
in the Unidroit Principles are more favourable than the CISG since it is better to 
strike out clauses deemed to be unreasonable in the circumstances of a specific case 
rather than to exclude the application of the conditions as such. 
 
While under the CISG a court, notwithstanding the fact that the right to require per-
formance is expressly stated in Artt. 46 and 62 CISG, is not bound to enter a judge-
ment for specific performance unless it would do so under its own domestic law367, 
according to the Unidroit Principles specific performance is not a discretionary rem-
edy and hence a court must order performance, unless one of the exceptions laid 
down in Art. 7.2.2  applies.368 Further the provisions Art. 2.11 Unidroit Principles 
and Art. 19 (3) CISG are contrary. Likewise, while Art. 19 (3) CISG states that any 
modifying term contained in the purported acceptance, relating to the price, payment 
quality and quantity of the goods, place and time of delivery, extent of one party’s 
liability to the other or the settlement of disputes, is considered to be a material 
modification of the terms of the offer and therefore transforms the acceptance into a 
counter-offer, no such list is provided in the corresponding Unidroit Principles provi-
sion369. 
 
Except the aforementioned the provisions in the CISG and the Unidroit Principles 
addressing the same issues are not necessarily incompatible and indeed can usefully 
support one another. Notwithstanding the wide acceptance of the CISG it might still 
occur that a sales contract does not fall within the scope of the CISG but that there is 
room for applying the Unidroit Principles as an alternative set of internationally uni-
form rules.370 However whenever the requirements for the application of the CISG 
exist, the CISG will normally take precedence over the Unidroit Principles in view of 
its binding character. Yet even in the event the contract is governed by the CISG, the 
                                                 
366 Bonell on  http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg.biblio/ulr96.html (15.01.2006). 
367 Art. 28 CISG. 
368 See chapter 3.7. 
369 The Unidroit Principles Comment state that a material modification must be determined in each 
single case and an important factor to be taken into account in this respect is whether the additional of 
different terms are commonly used in the trade sector concerned and therefore do not come to a sur-
prise to the offeror.  
370 Either trough express to the effect by the parties themselves or because a reference in the contract 
to ‘general principles of law’ or the ‘lex mercatoria’ or the like as the governing law is considered to 
be equivalent to a reference to the Unidroit Principles. 
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5. The Unidroit Principles as a means to interpret and supplement the CISG 
Unidroit Principles may serve an important purpose as mentioned before on the 
grounds of Art. 7 CISG.  
 
Examples where the Unidroit Principles serve as an interpretation aid in terms of Art. 
7 (1) CISG are the following. The criteria laid down in Art. 7.3.1 Unidroit Principles 
for the determination of whether or not there has been a fundamental breach of con-
tract may be used for a better understanding of the corresponding CISG provision in 
Art. 25.371 Another example which was already discussed in chapter three is Art. 
7.1.7 (4) Unidroit Principles which by expressly mentioning among the remedies not 
affected by the occurrence of an impediment preventing a party from performance 
the right to terminate the contract, to withhold performance and to request interest on 
money due, but not the right to performance, makes it clearer that does the corre-
sponding provision in the CISG, Art. 79 (5). Yet besides clarifying unclear language, 
the Unidroit Principles may also be used to fill gaps found in the CISG by deriving 
the solutions in the Unidroit Principles for the specific question. Numerous commen-
tators already followed this observation and there already exists a large bibliography 
on articles and comments on where the Unidroit Principles were used in order to in-








                                                 
371 In addition to the general criterion laid down in Art. 25 CISG, i.e. the fact that the non-performance 
substantially deprives the aggrieved party of what it was entitled to expect under the contract, pro-
vided the other party could not reasonably have foreseen such result, Art. 7.3.1(2) Unidroit Principles 
indicates as further factors to be taken into account in each single case whether strict compliance with 
the non-fulfilled obligation is of essence under the contract, whether the non-performance is inten-
tional or reckless, whether the aggrieved party has reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other 
party’s future performance, and finally whether the defaulting party would suffer disproportionate loss 




The Unidroit Principles were drafted by a working group that was specifically 
formed for this purpose. Its members, representing all different legal and socio-
economic systems, were leading experts in the area of comparative law and interna-
tional trade law, among them were legal scholars, judges and civil servants. It is im-
portant to note that the members of the working group were appointed in their own 
capacity and not as representatives of their governments or their own legal sys-
tems.372 In their comparative work, emphasis was not only placed on considering as 
many national legal orders as possible but especially on finding a synthesis between 
the different legal systems, namely between the civil and the common law.373 As 
international sources, special attention was given to the CISG and, where appropri-
ate, to non-legislative instruments by professional bodies or trade associations, such 
as INCOTERMS374  or the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Cred-
its.375 The object of the drafting of the Unidroit Principles was not to unify domestic 
law by means of special legislation, but merely to restate existing international con-
tract law, it was not imperative to take each and every law of every single country 
into account, nor was it necessary for every legal system to have an equal influence 
on each issue at stake. It was therefore not decisive which rule was adopted by the 
majority of countries but rather which of the rules had the most persuasive value and/ 
or appeared to be particularly well-suited for cross border actions.376  The Unidroit 
Principles are regarded as very user-friendly. They are neutral, short and concise, 
clearly arranged and with its simple language, explanations and practical examples 
easily understandable.377 The reasons for the favourable acceptance of the Unidroit 
Principles are manifold378. 379  
                                                 
372 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html#b81(10.02.2006)/ Bonell on  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg.biblio/ulr96.html (15/01/2006). 
373 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html#b81(10.02.2006). 
374 International commercial terms. 
375 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html#b81(10.02.2006). 
376 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html (10.02.2006). 
377 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/baron.html#b81(10.02.2006). 
378 As pointed out by an eminent Swiss arbitrator: the Unidroit Principles, are likely to find a quite 
universal acceptance, since they have been worked out [...] with the contribution of over seventy well 
known specialists from all major areas and legal systems of the world, including formerly socialist 
countries, Latin America countries and countries of the Far East."  However there might also be more 
practical reasons for the success of the Unidroit Principles. To quote an experienced American lawyer: 
The great importance of the Principles is that the volume exists. It can be taken to court, it can be 
referred to page and article number, and persons who are referred to its provisions can locate and 
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6. Conclusion 
The CISG presents a landmark in the process of international unification of law.380 
The disparity of economic, political, and legal structure of the countries represented 
at the Vienna Conference suggests the difficulty of achieving legal uniformity. It also 
suggests the inevitability of compromises in order to integrate different concepts and 
ideas into an independent, workable, and meaningful system of regulating interna-
tional sales. This need for compromises is unprecedented in the history of the inter-
national unification of private law. 381 The attempt to develop a compromise among 
radically different legal cultures has inherent difficulties. Understandably, most dele-
gates wanted the Convention to embody as much as possible of their own national 
legal rules, either because of the assumption that what is familiar is probably better 
than what is strange, or as a result of the more pragmatic consideration that in inter-
national trade law the law of one's own country gives those familiar with it substan-
tial "know-how" advantages.382 Due to the aforementioned differences and difficul-
ties some issues had to be excluded at the outset from the scope of the envisaged 
instrument, while with respect to other items the conflicting views could only be 
overcome by compromise solutions leaving matters more or less undecided.383 In 
only being an observer from outside the author cannot deny to have the thoughts and 
critic that although it is understandable that each delegate tried to achieve that the 
own domestic rules prevail they should have taken the following thought in consid-
eration. Could it be that the own domestic law rules are outdated anyway? Germany 
e.g. had a law reform in 2002 and adopted mostly the CISG rules as law applicable 
for domestic contracts. Further they should have asked themselves whether or not 
there domestic rules qualify for the needs in international trade and that they are 
when dealing in an international trade field they get confronted with foreign law 
rules in any case. Having left open questions unresolved causes a greater insecurity 
in international trade than dealing with a matter differently than in ones own country.  
 
The negotiations leading up to the CISG had so amply demonstrated that this Con-
vention was the maximum that could be achieved at the legislative level, which was 
                                                                                                                                          
review them without difficulty. This alone is a great contribution towards making lex mercatoria de-
finitive and provable. 
379 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/pr-exper.html (10.02.2006). 
380 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html (10.02.2006). 
381 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/garro1.html (10.02.2006). 
382 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/garro1.html (10.02.2006). 
383 http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bonell.html (10.02.2006). 
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6. Conclusion 
the main reason for the drafters of the Unidroit Principles to abandon the idea of a 
binding instrument and instead take another road for its own project.384 Since the 
Unidroit Principles were not intended to become a binding instrument aimed at uni-
fying domestic laws they were much less conditioned by the differences existing 
between the various legal systems and therefore it was possible for them to address a 
number of matters which are either completely excluded or not sufficiently regulated 
in the CISG. Another reason for the addition of new provisions included in the 
Unidroit Principles was that the scope of the Principles is not limited to sales con-
tracts but also includes other kinds of transactions as well as service contracts. 
The outlining of the history in forming the instruments for the international trade 
shows the difficulties for the achievements of prevailing instruments over domestic 
law in international trade. The shortcomings in the CISG cannot be denied however 
when being aware of the difficulties and the discussions involved in forming the 
binding instrument one can understand the reasons hereof and does not get the im-
pression that the drafters neglectfully established the rules. As explained above the 
conditions and the foundation for the forming of the Unidroit Principles were not as 
difficult as the ones for the CISG and the freedom in creating the provisions was not 
as limited as when creating the CISG. Further the Unidroit Principles drafters has the 
advantage that the CISG already existed and were able to use it as an example when-
ever it was regarded as reasonable. In the opinion of the author the CISG is the real 
achievement when paying regard to the conditions under which it was drafted and the 
goal is reached as binding instrument. However the achievement and application of 
the Unidroit Principles can not be underestimated as the resulting application in to-
day’s international business life reflect. It can not be denied that the Unidroit Princi-
ples are often easier and better to apply however since the two sets of rules are no 
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